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THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
THE PANEL PROCEDURES OF THE GATT AND THE WTO: 
THE ROLE OF GATT AND WTO PANELS IN TRADE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
Petko D. Kantchevski∗ 
 
“Every experienced lawyer knows that 
cases are most often won and lost on 
procedural grounds.” 
 
D. Palmeter & P. Mavroidis 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In February 1945, the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations (ECOSOC) adopted a resolution and called for a conference to 
draft a charter for the International Trade Organization. The charter, 
known as the Havana Charter, concluded in 1948, but never came into 
effect due to the U.S. Congress’ failure to ratify it in 1950. Yet, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947,1 which 
was designed to be a part of the Havana Charter, came into force in 
eight states on January 1, 1948 pursuant to a protocol of provisional 
application. 2  Not only was the GATT “provisional” in nature 
throughout its entire existence, but its dispute settlement rules were 
vague and lacked details. In fact, the GATT contained only two 
provisions on dispute settlement, Articles XXII and XXIII, and neither 
contained any specific procedure. These dispute settlement provisions 
formed the basis of both GATT jurisprudence and decisions of the 
GATT Contracting Parties. The GATT was a multilateral trade 
instrument that provided a valuable framework for removing barriers 
 
 
∗ Petko Kantchevski is a Masters candidate in International Law at the Graduate 
Institute of International Studies, Geneva. The author is deeply grateful to Professor 
Lucius Caflisch for his unusual mentorship. The author would also like to thank 
Professor Joost Pauwelyn for his comments on an earlier draft. The article considers 
the differences between the GATT and the WTO’s dispute settlement proceedings as 
of June 2006, and all mistakes remain the sole responsibility of the author. 
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, October 30, 
1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, [hereinafter GATT, GATT 1947, or old GATT]. The GATT 
1947 should be distinguished from the GATT 1994. For the differences between the 
two, see text accompanying note 117 infra. 
2 Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, Jan. 1, 1948, 55 U.N.T.S. 308. 
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to international trade through multilateral trade negotiations called 
“trade rounds.” The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (1986–1994) (hereinafter Uruguay Round) culminated in 
the creation of an international organization called World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 3  When the WTO started functioning in the 
beginning of 1995, it had the chance to fully benefit from the GATT 
dispute settlement legacy developed over almost half a century.  
By reviewing the evolution of the procedural rules from 1947 on 
and comparing them with the current WTO rules, this Article will 
assess the differences between the old GATT dispute settlement 
mechanism and the new WTO system. This analysis will show that the 
differences are not significant because the WTO system is based 
largely on what has been learned through the existence of the GATT. 
Additionally, and most importantly, it will show that the WTO system 
is heading in the right direction because it is a more sophisticated 
system compared to that of the GATT. 
 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PANEL PROCEEDINGS 
 
A. Going from Diplomacy to Legal Adjudication 
 
When it comes to resolving trade disputes between contracting 
parties, the dispute resolution mechanisms within the GATT resemble 
diplomacy more than they do adjudication. In the early years of the 
GATT, it was the GATT Council Chairman who decided the dispute 
rulings. Later, working parties were organized to deal with disputes 
under GATT Article XXIII:2. Working parties included the 
complaining party, the party complained against, and all the interested 
government representatives. Generally, working parties consisted of 
about five to twenty delegations, depending upon the importance of 
the question and the interests involved.4 These working parties and 
their members operated by consensus and negotiation—a situation that 
may correctly be assessed as a political method of dispute settlement.  
 
 
3 Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, LT/UR/A/2 (in the sense of Articles I to XIV) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
The official text of the WTO Agreement and the agreements annexed to it, which were 
concluded at the end of the Uruguay Round are to be found in Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), reprinted in GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay 
Round, 6 (1994). 
4 Annex on Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the 
Field of Dispute Settlement, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) ¶ 6 (1980) [hereinafter 1979 
Annex on the Customary Practice of the GATT]. 
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In 1952, panels of three or five third-party experts from the GATT 
began hearing disputes arising out of the GATT. The pioneer case 
decided by a panel is Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines,5 
which involved Norway and Germany as opposing parties. 6  The 
parties eventually settled the dispute by mutual agreement, 7  but it 
became the first serious attempt towards third-party adjudication 
within the GATT.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, the procedural rules of the GATT panels 
had a limited scope because the method of adjudication remained 
highly diplomatic, and a large number of the panelists were diplomats, 
not lawyers. The fact that there was no legal division within the 
Secretariat of the GATT from 1948 to 1983 confirms that the 
Contracting Parties attempted to avoid legalism.8 Interesting evidence 
of this assertion is found in the annex to the Understanding Regarding 
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance9  of 
1979, which provides: 
 
At the Review Session (1955) the proposal to 
institutionalise the procedures of panels was not 
adopted by CONTRACTING PARTIES mainly 
because they preferred to preserve the existing 
situation and not to establish judicial procedures which 
might put excessive strain on the GATT.10 
 
 
 
5 Report of the Panel, Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, (Oct. 31, 
1952), GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 53 (1953). 
6 In this case, Norway complained that reasonable expectations deriving from 
tariff negotiations conducted with Germany on the basis of equal tariff treatment of 
two closely related items (two kinds of sardines which were “like products”) were 
impaired. It is interesting that the formulation of the claim much resembles a “non-
violation complaint, which was rarely used in the old GATT dispute settlement 
system. Germany was invited to remove the competitive inequality between the 
products concerned by a Contracting Parties’ Resolution.” GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) 
at 30–31 (1953). 
7 A note on the outcome has been published in GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 69 
(1959).  
8 In this sense, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, xiii (Kluwer Law International 1997). 
9 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and 
Surveillance, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980) [hereinafter 
1979 Understanding]. 
10 1979 Annex on the Customary Practice of the GATT, supra note 4, at 215, 
footnote to ¶1. 
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Even in the beginning of the Uruguay Round in 1986, dispute 
settlement within the GATT remained highly diplomatic. Parties had 
the opportunity to settle, meaning that, for example, the GATT Parties 
still had the freedom to accept or reject the proposed panel solution, 
because adoption of a panel report required a positive consensus 
among the GATT Council.11  
The adoption of panel reports by positive consensus of all GATT 
Parties appears contestable, because from a legal perspective, GATT 
Article XXV:4 provides, “except as otherwise provided for in this 
Agreement, decisions of the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be 
taken by a majority of the votes cast.”12  The agreement does not 
prescribe any exceptions to this Article; therefore, in the early years of 
the GATT, adoption of panel reports required a majority vote. 13 
However, in the 1950s, it became a customary practice for Contracting 
Parties to adopt panel reports by consensus. The Ministerial 
Declaration of 1982 clarified this procedure, stating that 
“CONTRACTING PARTIES reaffirmed that consensus will continue 
to be the traditional method of resolving disputes.” 14  At the 
Ministerial Meeting, the Contracting Parties tried to adopt a proposal, 
according to which the disputing parties would not have the right to 
vote on the panel report adoption. As a result, the GATT Parties made 
an effort to include a “consensus minus two” rule for the adoption of 
panel reports in the Ministerial Declaration.15 However, even if the 
“consensus minus two” rule had been adopted, it would not have 
solved the problem because one GATT party could easily have found 
another GATT party to help block the adoption of a report. 
On one hand, E.U. Petersmann argues that the majority of 
decisions on dispute settlement within the old GATT were legally 
inadmissible. In his view, the Roman law maxim nemo debet esse 
judex in propria causa (no one should be a judge in his own case) is a 
general principle of law and is recognized as a principle of 
 
 
11 Under the old GATT practice of taking decisions by consensus, a single 
formal objection by any Contracting Party, including the respondent, was enough to 
block the adoption of a panel report. 
12 GATT 1947, supra note 1, at art. XXV:4. 
13 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Strengthening GATT Procedures for Settling 
Trade Disputes, 11 WORLD ECONOMY 55, 74 (1988). 
14 Ministerial Decision on Dispute Settlement of 29 November 1982, L/5424, 
GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 13, ¶ (x), (1983) [hereinafter 1982 Ministerial 
Declaration]. 
15 Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and 
Does Not, 4 J. INT’L ARB. 53, 95–96 (1987). 
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international law.16 Therefore, a possible solution to the blockage of a 
panel report adoption was to exclude the losing party from voting.17 
On the other hand, the procedural rules of the GATT had evolved 
over the years, and although the provisions of GATT Articles XXII 
and XXIII were initially unclear, the GATT Parties increasingly 
legalized and codified the GATT dispute settlement practice. Since the 
Kennedy Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations between 1962 and 
1967, a number of decisions and understandings made in 1966, 1979, 
1982, 1984, and 1989 codified and supplemented the procedural 
dispute settlement rules. 18  The most important documents among 
these are the 1979 Understanding and its 1979 Annex on the 
Customary Practice of the GATT.19 These documents prescribe that 
each panel was required to organize its own procedures by holding two 
or three formal meetings with the parties and inviting parties to present 
their views in written or oral form. It also permitted any Contracting 
Party that had a substantial interest in the matter, but who was not 
directly involved in the dispute (i.e., a third party), to be heard by the 
panel. Over the years, panels gradually began to follow previous panel 
findings, creating predictability within the system. 
Some of the difficulties of the old GATT dispute resolution 
mechanism included: (1) delays in the establishment of panels and the 
adoption of panel reports; (2) “rule shopping” between the general 
GATT procedure and the special procedure prescribed in the Tokyo 
Round Agreements, which appeared not to be successful;20 and (3) 
increase of non-compliance with the GATT Council rulings, especially 
in the 1980s. However, the major weakness of the GATT system was 
that all important matters concerning the dispute settlement procedure 
had to be decided by a consensus of the Contracting Parties. Thus the 
parties to a dispute, and more particularly the losing party, could block 
 
 
16 Petersmann, supra note 13, at 74. 
17  “[A] Chairman of the GATT Council might, arguably, feel entitled likewise 
to propose that persistent obstruction by the ‘losing’ party alone to the adoption of a 
panel report does not affect the ‘consensus.’” Id. at 74–75. 
18 All these documents can be found in 2 ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT 
LAW AND PRACTICE 623–42 (WTO 1995). 
19 GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1979). 
20 Not only “rule shopping,” but also a kind of “forum shopping” existed after 
the Tokyo Round: the Contracting Parties could choose to bring a case before a panel 
or before an Anti-Dumping Committee under the Anti-Dumping Code, or before a 
special panel established by the Subsidies Code, following the procedure prescribed 
by it. 
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not only the adoption of a panel report, but also the establishment of a 
panel.21 
In the 1980s, the Contracting Parties attempted to solve the 
problems associated with consensus and tried to prevent blocking the 
establishment of panels by adopting the Decision on Improvements to 
the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedure in 1989 
(hereinafter 1989 Contracting Parties’ Decision). Although this 
decision was applicable on a provisional basis until the end of the 
Uruguay Round, it became the basis for the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter 
DSU),22 which came into effect on January 1, 1995. The Contracting 
Parties’ Decision made significant changes. For example, it reduced 
the time limit to reply to consultation requests to ten days, and it 
shortened the time in which negotiations could be entered into to thirty 
days. The Contracting Parties’ Decision also provided the option of 
requesting the establishment of a panel if consultations did not solve 
the dispute within sixty days. However, perhaps its most important 
improvement was in creating a barrier to block the establishment of a 
panel. It provided that a decision to establish a panel must be made by 
the second meeting of the GATT Council after the request first appears 
on its agenda, unless the council decides otherwise, i.e., by consensus 
not to establish a panel (the so-called negative consensus).23 However, 
the Contracting Parties applied all these improvements only 
provisionally, and one of the major difficulties was that there had been 
no change in the actual rules at that time.24  
Another weakness of the GATT dispute settlement system was the 
possibility for GATT Contracting Parties to take unilateral actions. 
Furthermore, the confidence in the ability of the GATT dispute 
resolution mechanism to resolve difficult cases, especially in 
 
 
21 Petersmann expresses a positive opinion on the overall adoption of the panel 
reports, but emphasizes that since the 1980s there has been “blockage” of an 
increasing number of reports. Petersmann, supra note 13, at 88–89. However, 
Palmeter and Mavroidis remark that blocking of the reports only occur in very rare 
cases. See DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE at 9 (2d ed., Cambridge 
University Press 2004). 
22 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 
1225 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
23 Art. F (a), Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and 
Procedures, Decision of Apr. 12, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1989). 
24 Indeed, the risk of one party blocking adoption must often have influenced the 
panel’s rulings within the GATT. The three panelists knew that the report also had to 
be accepted by the “losing” party. 
WINTER 2006 PANEL PROCEDURES 
85 
politically sensitive areas, decreased in the 1980s. As a result, 
individual Contracting Parties preferred to take unilateral and direct 
action against other parties to enforce their rights rather than invoke 
the GATT dispute settlement system.25 
Japan – Agricultural Products26 is a case that illustrates the flaws 
of the old procedure and the numerous opportunities for the parties, 
particularly the defendant, to delay the dispute settlement proceedings. 
Beginning in October 1981, the United States and Japan held informal 
consultations regarding Japanese agricultural barriers. At that time, 
diplomatic solutions were favored over recourse to law. Through July 
1983, the United States officially submitted requests for consultations 
within the GATT concerning agricultural restrictions related to 
thirteen goods. One year later (and more than two years after the U.S. 
first raised the issue of GATT violations), the parties reached a 
compromise outside the GATT legal proceedings and signed an 
agreement in July 1984. The United States agreed to withdraw its 
complaint for two years, while Japan agreed to liberalize trade on six 
types of goods. E. Eichmann observes that on the one hand, the 
solution reached outside of the legal framework was the result of a 
party’s political and trade influence: on the other hand, the solution 
legitimized an otherwise illegal GATT practice that caused harm to 
third parties. Consequently, the losers were those parties with less 
political and economic clout.27  
The new WTO system tackles the problem mentioned above by 
legalization. Often referred to as “quasi-judicial,” the new dispute 
settlement system is based more on law than its predecessor. This 
Article analyzes many features of the new WTO system, the analysis 
of which will lead to the conclusion of this Article. 
First, a basic feature of the “legalization” of the WTO dispute 
settlement system is the compulsory jurisdiction of a Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB).28 Member States of the WTO have accepted 
 
 
25 WTO SECRETARIAT, A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEM 14 (Cambridge University Press 2004) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. 
26 Report of the Panel, Japan—Restrictions on Import of Certain Agricultural 
Products, L/6253 (Nov. 18, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 163 (1987). 
27 Erwin P. Eichmann, Procedural Aspects of GATT Dispute Settlement: Moving 
Towards Legalism, 8 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 38, 42–48 (1990). 
28 Compulsory jurisdiction is rare in international law because, as a rule, disputes 
involve sovereign states. The strongest argument in this respect is the optional 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The Member States of the UN must 
recognize the jurisdiction of the Court in order for the court to be competent to hear 
the respective dispute. As a matter of fact, there are only two global treaties in 
international law—the WTO Agreement and the United Nations Convention of the 
Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS)—which provide for compulsory dispute 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 3 
86 
in advance the decisions of the DSB, according to Article 23.1 of the 
DSU, which provides that Members shall have recourse to, and abide 
by, the rules and procedure of the DSU.29 An adopted Appellate Body 
report shall be “unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute” 
on account of Article 17.14 of the DSU.30 Although this provision 
refers only to Appellate Body reports, it is also applicable to adopted 
panel reports because the legal binding force comes from the DSB 
decision.  
Moreover, the compulsory jurisdiction of the DSB concerning the 
settlement of disputes heavily influences the entire panel process. The 
automatic character of this process allows the complainant to start the 
procedure, going from one stage to another, bringing the case to a 
binding decision by the DSB, even if the respondent is reluctant to 
cooperate. The will and intention of the other party in this panel 
process is essential because the major aim of the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism is to “secure a positive solution to a dispute.”31 
Unfortunately, a “positive solution” (i.e., a solution that is acceptable 
to all parties) is not always possible. For this reason, the new 
mechanism must provide some safeguards for the Members’ rights 
under the WTO Agreements. Under the new dispute settlement 
system, the respondent is not permitted to impede the initiation of the 
panel procedure or to subsequently block the adoption of the panel 
reports.  
Another important element of the WTO dispute settlement system 
is its legal primacy over all other means of dispute settlement. Unlike 
the GATT, the DSU firmly stipulates that when a Member seeks 
redress from a violation of obligations, nullification, or impairment of 
benefits under the covered agreements, it “shall have recourse to, and 
abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.”32 Article 23 
 
 
settlement procedures. However, unlike the WTO Agreement, the UNCLOS excludes 
from its compulsory procedure a number of disputes arising out of the interpretation 
and application of the Convention. Note that the dispute settlement within the WTO 
has a unique character. See, e.g., United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, 
Section 3, art. 297 et seq., Montego bay, Dec. 19, 1982, In force Nov. 16, 1994, 21 
I.L.M. 1245 (1982). 
29 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 17.14. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at art. 3.7. 
32 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 23.1. An exception to this rule reads: “Nothing in 
this Agreement shall impair the rights of Members under other international 
agreements, including the right to resort to the good offices or dispute settlement 
mechanisms of other international organizations or established under any international 
agreement.” Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
Art. 11(3) (Apr. 15, 1994) (often referred to as the SPS Agreement). Reproduced in 
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of the DSU also precludes the use of other unilateral action for the 
resolution of WTO-related disputes.33 Only on the basis of adopted 
panel or Appellate Body reports can a Member initiate an action 
against other Members, provided that there is an authorization from 
the DSB. 
Primacy of the WTO dispute settlement procedure also includes 
primacy over bilaterally agreed settlements. A mutually acceptable 
solution to a dispute is “clearly to be preferred,”34 but it may not 
comply with the WTO rules and may impair the rights of other 
Members. For this reason, the DSU requires that the settlement of a 
dispute be consistent with the WTO rules to ensure that agreements do 
not impair the rights of other Members. 
Furthermore, the WTO system encourages parties of a dispute to 
reach a mutually agreed solution during each stage of the panel 
process, and it allows the complainant to stop the panel procedure at 
any given time. If this occurs, parties must notify the DSB and the 
 
 
THE LEGAL TEXTS.THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 401 (Cambridge University Press & WTO 1999) at 65.  
33 This means that an inconsistency of a trade measure with WTO obligations can 
be determined only through recourse to the procedure provided in the DSU. However, 
disputes on trade issues arising out of other international trade agreements, which 
cover similar matters, may be submitted to other international fora. Since identical 
trade issues may overlap in NAFTA and the WTO Agreements, NAFTA provides that 
the claimant may choose which forum to use. Once a forum has been chosen, the 
complainant has chosen a forum, it and cannot bring the same claim to the other 
forum. Nonetheless, one may argue that even if the complainant submits a claim under 
the NAFTA, the dispute would not be the same as the alleged violation and must relate 
to the NAFTA and not the WTO Agreements. Consequently, the forum under the 
NAFTA will examine whether the measure violates the NAFTA and not the WTO 
Agreements. Hence, the legal basis to bring a claim will be different. In Mexico—Soft 
Drinks, Mexico challenged the panel’s jurisdiction because, in its view, the dispute 
was a part of a larger dispute between the United States and Mexico had already been 
brought under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The panel found 
that neither the subject matter nor the respective positions of the parties in the dispute 
were identical under the NAFTA and the WTO. The panel added that:  
 
[E]ven conceding that there seems to be an unresolved dispute 
between Mexico and the United States under the NAFTA, the 
resolution of the present WTO case cannot be linked to the NAFTA 
dispute. In turn, any findings made by this Panel, as well as its 
conclusions and recommendations in the present case, only relate to 
Mexico's rights and obligations under the WTO covered agreements, 
and not to its rights and obligations under other international 
agreements, such as the NAFTA, or other rules of international law. 
 
Panel Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶ 7.15, 
WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005). 
34 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.7, second phrase. 
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relevant councils and committees.35 To protect the interests of third 
parties, the WTO system allows WTO Members the opportunity to 
raise any points relating to the solution reached when the council or 
committee convenes.36 This notification requirement avoids possible 
interference with other Members’ rights due to a bilateral settlement 
reached outside the panel or the appeal procedure. Interdependence 
among all WTO Members in the international trading system is 
inevitable, and this rule strengthens its multilateral character.  
Thus the WTO has maintained the settlement feature of the 
GATT, but is more fair to other parties in the agreement, especially 
since the DSB is available if one party tries to over assert its political 
and economic influence in negotiating a settlement. 
 
B. A Unified Dispute Settlement System 
 
Article II:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization37 stipulates that the DSU is an integral part of the 
WTO Agreement, and more importantly, is binding upon all WTO 
Members. All Members that are parties to the settlement procedure are 
bound by the DSB’s decision concerning that dispute, thus providing 
more predictability to WTO Members and minimizing the risk of 
contradictory decisions. As a result, “opt outs” from WTO Multilateral 
Agreements and the DSU are no longer possible. This new concept 
improves and differs from those embodied in the agreements of the 
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (hereinafter Tokyo 
Round) 38  because the old “GATT à la carte” system allowed 
Contracting Parties to choose between the general GATT dispute 
settlement mechanism and the special procedures prescribed by the 
various agreements concluded in the Tokyo Round.39  
 
 
35 Id. at art. 3.6.  
36 Id. 
37 WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. II:2 
38 The system embodied in the Tokyo Round agreements are also known as 
“GATT à la carte.” 
39 This practice proved to be unsuccessful. See Petersmann, supra note 13, at 88–
89; see also Plank, supra note 15, at 89. Several panel reports following the Subsidies 
Code were legally unsound and not adopted. For instance, the Subsidies Code 
prescribed in Article 16(2) a two-month period for a panel to deliver its written report 
to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Noting the complex 
legal nature of subsidies, this time-limit seems unrealistic. Agreement on 
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 56 (1980). Cf. Eichmann, supra 
note 27, at 72 and text accompanying note 215. The author comes to a similar 
conclusion. In addition, the Subsidies Code provided a mandatory conciliation phase 
under Article XVII, which was unnecessary and only prolonged the process. 
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This does not mean that the WTO Agreements40 do not prescribe 
special rules for dispute settlement. Rather, the difference is that 
Members will not be able to practice “rule shopping” by choosing the 
procedure that will best suit them. If there is a special procedure, 
which complements the general regime, the Members will follow the 
special procedure because lex specialis derogate legi generali (the 
more specialized norm prevails over the general). Article 1.2 of the 
DSU confirms this application of special procedures.41 The Appellate 
Body has stated in Guatemala-Cement that “the rules and procedures 
of the DSU apply together with the special or additional provisions of 
the covered agreement,” and if there is a conflict between them, the 
special or additional provision prevails.42 
Another advantage of the current WTO dispute settlement system 
is that it avoids the fragmentation embodied in the earlier GATT 
dispute settlement mechanism. Currently, all WTO Members are 
parties to each of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, including the 
DSU, because it is an integral part of the WTO Agreement. The same 
requirements are applicable to every potential new Member where the 
prerequisite for joining the WTO is to become a party to all the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements. In practical terms, under the current 
regime, all Members, big or small, have similar rights and obligations. 
According to the dispute settlement process, all WTO Members are 
entitled to the same procedure for a given set of circumstances. 
 
C. The Structural Change 
 
1. The DSB 
 
The WTO dispute settlement system is more precise than the 
GATT mechanism. Under the old GATT, panels were established by 
the GATT Council, 43  whereas panels under the WTO system are 
established by the DSB. The WTO Agreement established the DSB,44 
which consists of representatives from all WTO Members who 
 
 
40 The term “WTO Agreements” includes the agreements and associated legal 
instruments included in Annexes 1 and 2 to the WTO Agreement, which are binding 
on all Members. 
41 See DSU, supra note 22, at art. 1.2. 
42 Appellate Body Report, Guatemala—Anti-dumping Investigation Regarding 
Portland Cement from Mexico, ¶ 65, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998). 
43  “The Council is empowered to act for the CONTRACTING PARTIES, in 
accordance with normal GATT practice.” 1979 Annex on the Customary Practice of 
the GATT, supra note 4, at ¶ 1, footnote. 
44 WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. IV:3. 
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administer the rules and procedures of the DSU. The DSB deals with 
disputes arising out of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to the 
DSU45. It also has the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and 
Appellate Body reports, and monitor their implementation. Thus the 
DSB has been considered as “the General Council acting in another 
guise”46 because it consists of representatives of all WTO Members. 
More precisely, the DSB is a special body distinct from the General 
Council because of the following features: 1) the DSB is a specialized 
body, dealing exclusively with dispute settlement issues; 2) the DSB 
has its own working procedure distinct from the General Council; 3) 
the DSB has a distinct chairmanship; and 4) the representatives of the 
Member states may not be the same as those in the General Council.  
 
2. Decisions of the DSB 
 
The decisions of the DSB are adopted by consensus47 if no special 
rule exists. This situation follows the established GATT tradition of 
decision-making by consensus,48 which is represented in Article IX: 1 
of the WTO Agreement.49 In practice, the chairperson of the DSB asks 
whether there are any objections to the adoption of a decision, and if 
no representative indicates an objection, then the chairperson 
announces the adoption of the decision. However, a revolutionary 
feature that differs from the old GATT dispute settlement process is 
that the most important decisions regarding panel procedure (e.g., the 
establishment of panels, the adoption of panel reports, or the 
authorization of retaliatory action) are adopted by reverse consensus. 
Consequently, in order to block the adoption of a panel report, all 
WTO Members, including the complaining party, must vote against its 
adoption.50  This idea will be discussed in further detail under the 
“Panel Process” Discussion found in Part III of this Article. 
Nevertheless, the power of the DSB to deny the establishment of a 
panel or the adoption of a panel report is considered by some to be 
 
 
45 DSU, supra note 22, at 1244, app. 1. 
46 PETER GALLAGHER, GUIDE TO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 6 (Kluwer Law 
International, 2002). 
47 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 2.4 n.1. Provides that a decision is taken if no 
Member, present and voting, formally objects to the proposed decision. 
48 WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. IX:1 “The WTO shall continue the 
practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947.” 
49 Id.  
50 DSU art. 16.4 specifies that the panel report shall be adopted by the DSB 
within sixty days after its circulation to the Members unless a party appeals or the 
DSU decides by consensus not to adopt the report. DSU, supra note 22. 
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“more illusory than real”51 because it is almost impossible for DSB to 
do so with the new reverse consensus. Although the DSB plays a 
substantial role in the dispute settlement procedure, it is unable to 
block the establishment of a panel or the adoption of a report. As a 
result, WTO Members play a less active role in the dispute settlement 
process than they did within the GATT. 
 
3. Clarification of provisions 
 
Panels are authorized to clarify provisions of the WTO 
Agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law.52 A decision of the DSB to adopt a panel 
report binds only the parties to the particular dispute. Article IX:2 of 
the WTO Agreement provides that only the Ministerial Conference 
and the General Council of the WTO have “exclusive authority” to 
adopt interpretations of the WTO Agreement.53 Therefore, if WTO 
Members do not agree with the legal reasoning made by a panel, they 
may ask for an “authoritative interpretation” under Article IX:2 of the 
WTO Agreement, which is binding on all WTO Members, and on 
every panel when applying the provision to future cases. 
 
D. The Scope of the DSU 
 
1. Ratione materiae: what agreements does the WTO cover? 
 
The WTO Agreements contain considerably more legal 
obligations than the old GATT, such as trade-in services and trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights.54 Basically, the scope of 
the DSU is much broader than its GATT counterparts of Articles XXII 
and XIII.55 The DSU applies to disputes arising out of the provisions 
of the “covered agreements” listed in Appendix 1 to the DSU56 and 
includes the Multilateral Agreements on the Trade in Goods, 57 
 
 
51 Id. 
52 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.2. 
53 See WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. IX:2. 
54 The WTO Agreements also contain a number of new obligations related to 
trade in goods such as obligations concerning trade-related investment measures 
(TRIMS), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), trade in agriculture and textile. 
55 GATT, supra note 1, at arts. XXII, XIII. 
56 See DSU, supra note 22, app. 1. 
57 These are: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; Agreement on 
Agriculture; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures; 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade; 
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“General Agreement on Trade in Services” (GATS), 58  and 
“Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” 
(TRIPS).59 Additionally, the DSU applies to disputes arising out of the 
WTO Agreement60 and the DSU itself.61  
It is worth noting that the DSU may also apply to disputes related 
to the Plurilateral Trade Agreements (PTA) in Annex 4 of the WTO 
Agreement, 62  if the parties to each of these agreements adopt a 
decision setting out the terms for the application of the DSU to the 
individual agreement. 63  The parties are also required to notify the 
DSB of the decision taken.64 Because of this specific feature of the 
application of the DSU to the PTA, the term “covered agreements” 
may not always include the PTA. Where the DSB administers dispute 
settlement issues under a PTA, only Members that are parties to that 
Agreement may participate in decisions or actions taken by the DSB 
with respect to that dispute. 
In sum, the inclusion of all of the aforementioned agreements in 
the DSU illustrates the WTO dispute settlement system is significantly 
broader in scope than the old GATT Articles XXII and XIII. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures; Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; 
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; Agreement on Rules of Origin; Agreement on 
Import Licensing Procedures; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; 
Agreement on Safeguards. 
58 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1168 
(1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
59 Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 
1C to the WTO Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 1997 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
60 See WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at arts. I–XIV. 
61 DSU, supra note 22, at 1226, art. 1.1. 
62 Those are the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and the Agreement on 
Government Procurement. In contrast with the Multilateral Trade Agreements, which 
are binding on all WTO Members, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements are binding only 
on those Members that have accepted them and do not create either obligations or 
rights for the Members that have not accepted them. The International Dairy 
Agreement and the International Bovine Meat Agreement, which were also included 
in Annex 4, were terminated at the end of 1997.  
63 The Committee on Government Procurement has taken such a decision. See 
Notification under Appendix 1 of the DSU, Communication from the Chairman of the 
Committee on Government Procurement, WT/DSB/7 (July 12, 1996). 
64 See DSU, supra note 22, at 1244, app. 1. 
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2. Ratione personae: who is subject to the WTO? 
 
The WTO Panel Procedure remains as an intergovernmental 
dispute settlement mechanism whereby only WTO Members may be 
parties or third parties in a panel process to a trade dispute arising out 
of a covered agreement. In addition to states, separate custom 
territories that possess full autonomy of their external commercial 
relations may also be parties to the WTO Agreement and may become 
WTO Members.65 Consequently, Member states and territories can 
bring forth panel proceedings or be a respondent or third party in a 
trade dispute.66 For example, although the European Communities did 
not constitute a state, yet it participated in a number of WTO 
proceedings.67 
The DSU applies not only to measures taken by Member 
governments, but actions taken by regional and local governments as 
well. In a footnote to Article 4.2 of the Understanding, it states, 
“where the provisions of any other covered agreement concerning 
measures taken by regional or local governments or authorities within 
the territory of a Member contain provisions different from the 
provisions of this paragraph, the provisions of such other covered 
agreement shall prevail.”67 This Article permits the DSU to cover 
actions by regional and local governments. Similarly, the 
“Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 
1994”68 stipulates that each Member must take reasonable measures in 
ensuring that regional and local governments, as well as authorities 
within its territories, observe the provisions of the GATT 1994. 
Another multilateral agreement that regulates regional and local 
government action is GATS, which provides in Article I:3 that: 
 
For the purpose of this Agreement:  
(a) “measures by Members” means measures taken by: 
 
 
65 WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at art. XII:1. 
66 Also note that a metropolitan customs territory of a GATT Contracting Party, 
though not a party to the GATT, was treated as though it were a Contracting Party for 
the purposes of the territorial application of the agreement (GATT Art. XXIV). For 
this reason, GATT Contracting Parties could initiate panel proceedings on behalf of 
non-member entities—for instance, the Netherlands brought a claim against the US on 
behalf of the Netherlands Antilles in 1994. Because the old GATT is a part of the 
GATT 1994, this situation still prevails under the new regime. However, GATT 1994 
is legally distinct from the old GATT 1947. 
 
 
67 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 4.2 n.3. 
68 Understanding of the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, ¶¶ 13 
and 14, reprinted in 2 ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE, 793–
94 (WTO 1995). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 3 
94 
(i) central, regional or local governments and 
authorities; and 
(ii) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of 
powers delegated by central, regional or local 
governments or authorities; 
 
In fulfilling its obligations and commitments under the 
Agreement, each Member shall take such reasonable 
measures as may be available to it to ensure their 
observance by regional and local governments and 
authorities and non-governmental bodies within its 
territory. 
 
The GATS places Members under the additional obligation of not 
only ensuring that the central, regional and local authorities are 
upholding the GATT 1994, but that the non-governmental bodies 
exercising powers on behalf of the noted authorities are in compliance 
as well. Therefore, the WTO system regulates this issue in more detail 
and encompasses a broader scope ratione personae than its 
predecessor.69 
 
III. THE PANEL PROCESS 
 
A. Establishment of Panels 
 
It is easier to establish panels under the WTO than it is under the 
old GATT. Through the new rule of reverse consensus, the WTO 
establishes panels without the delays encountered under the GATT. In 
order to reject the establishment of a panel, all WTO Members, 
including the complaining party, must vote against establishment. The 
respondent may not delay the establishment beyond the second 
meeting of the DSB after the request appears on its agenda by virtue of 
Article 6.1 of the DSU.70 If a complaining party so requests, a meeting 
of the DSB shall convene specifically for this purpose within fifteen 
days of the request as long as notice is given ten days prior to the 
meeting.71 
Parties address panel requests to the Chairman of the DSB. The 
request must indicate whether consultations were held, must specify 
 
 
69 TRIPS does not contain any provisions in this respect, since intellectual 
property rights are normally within the competences of the central, rather than the 
regional or local authorities. 
70 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 6.1. 
71 Id. at art. 6.1, footnote. 
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the measures at issue, and must provide a brief summary of the legal 
basis of the complaint. The request must contain the terms of 
reference, which define the scope of the dispute and the panel’s 
jurisdiction. Proper elaboration of the terms of reference is vital not 
only to start the panel proceedings, but also for its outcome.  
Under the old GATT, a panel could be established only if 
consensus among all Contracting Parties existed; therefore, the 
respondent could easily block the establishment of a panel in the 
GATT Council. However, in practice this delay continued for only a 
few GATT Council meetings. 72  Until 1987, the longest debate to 
establish a panel took four council meetings, 73  which may be 
explained by the GATT Contracting Parties’ desire to respect 
obligations set forth under the agreement. GATT Members understood 
that if one violates a rule, another Member would equally do so to the 
detriment of the former. This is a logical result in both the GATT 
international trade regime and now in the WTO, where reciprocity of 
the obligations plays a vital role. Thus under the GATT, the political 
pressure stemming from violations was sometimes enormous, and 
deterred future violations even more successfully than a legal 
obligation. As late as 1989, the 1989 Contracting Parties’ Decision74 
recognized a complainant’s right to a panel by introducing reverse 
consensus. This decision was applied on a provisional basis, and the 
DSU fortunately reaffirmed this right. 
 
B. Composition of Panels 
 
The WTO Secretariat maintains a list from which panel Members 
are selected. However, it is not necessary to be on the list to be a 
potential panel member in a particular dispute. Article 8.3 of the DSU 
forbids a potential panel member from serving on a panel if he or she 
is a citizen of a Member-state party to the dispute, or a citizen of a 
third party, unless the parties agree otherwise.75 This rule originated 
from the old GATT dispute settlement process. Because most disputes 
involve economic powers such as the United States, the European 
Community, and Japan, P. Pescatore argues that this practice within 
 
 
72 Petersmann, supra note 13. 
73 Plank, supra note 15, at 64. 
74 The decision was agreed at a Ministerial Meeting in Montreal, Canada as early 
as December 9, 1988. However, it was formally adopted on April 12, 1989 because 
the ministers awaited the finalization of some other agreements (including textiles and 
agriculture). Its formal name is Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules 
and Procedures, Decision of 12 April 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1989). 
75 See DSU, supra note 22, at art. 8.3. 
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the GATT acted as a “de facto ban” on publicly known trade 
specialists from these states.76 The same argument could be said for 
the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Third-party participation in the panel proceedings has increased 
under the WTO.77 However, some disputes involving numerous third 
parties significantly reduce the number of trade experts who may 
potentially serve as panel members because of the application of 
Article 8.3. The DSB gives Members ten days to give notice of their 
interest in the matter and of their intentions of being third parties. 
After the deadline expires, the disputing parties and the Secretariat 
may proceed with the negotiations on the panel composition. 
The DSU contains detailed rules on the composition of panels and 
clarifies the role of the Director-General if the parties fail to agree on 
the panel's composition. Unlike the WTO, which allows well-qualified 
non-government individuals to serve on panels, only government 
officials served in the panels in the first years of the GATT. Within the 
GATT, panelist selection carried great significance and required 
approval by both parties. This created concerns that a panelist may 
favor a particular party. Paragraph 11 of the 1979 Understanding 
specifies that “the members of a panel would preferably be 
governmental.”78 The 1979 Annex on the Customary Practice of the 
GATT states that as of 1979, there are only a few cases in which 
parties agreed to designate non-government experts, considering “the 
nature and complexity of the matter.”79 Notably, government officials 
from GATT delegations in Geneva may find it difficult to ignore their 
own governments’ economic and political interests,80 and this may 
impact the outcome of the panel process. When career diplomats serve 
as panelists, they may over-emphasize conciliation instead of reaching 
legal interpretations based on legal norms. 81  With the growing 
complexity of the rules contained within the GATT framework, the 
participation of independent trade experts on the panels became 
 
 
76 Pierre Pescatore, The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Its Present 
Situation and its Prospects, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 27, 30 (1993). 
77 For example, in EC—Bananas III, as many as twenty-three parties participated 
in the panel proceedings. See European Communities—Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997: II 589 (Sept. 9, 1997). 
78 Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and 
Surveillance (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 212, ¶11 (1980). 
79 Annex on Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the 
Field of Dispute Settlement GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 217, ¶ 6(iii) (1980). 
80 There have even been instances in the old GATT system in which 
governments tried to exercise pressure on panelists. In one case, a panelist resigned. 
See Plank, supra note 15, at 81–82. 
81 See Eichmann, supra note 27, at 52. 
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inevitable. The situation changed with the introduction of a roster of 
non-government panelists in 1984. As in the GATT, WTO panelists 
serve in their individual capacities and are not permitted to receive 
instructions or be influenced regarding panel matters. 
The time-limits set by the DSU do not allow the parties to delay 
the formation of a panel, which may comprise of three or five 
Members. Parties may agree on the composition of a five-member 
panel within ten days from the establishment of the panel. Panelists 
“are selected by the parties to examine the particular dispute.” 82 
Indeed, in most cases, the parties select the panelists, but this is not 
always the case. The DSU requires the WTO Secretariat to propose 
panelists. Parties cannot oppose such proposals except for “compelling 
reasons.” 83  Thus panel composition remains a peculiarity, 
distinguishing the GATT and WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
from arbitration. Judge P. Pescatore emphasizes that the Director-
General of GATT, not the parties, proposed the nominations. In his 
view, this appointment procedure gave panelists “the consciousness of 
being vested with a mandate emanating from the whole of the GATT 
community.” 84  Within WTO, this function has remained almost 
unchanged. While parties may suggest panelists, the WTO Secretariat 
finalizes the panel’s composition. If the parties cannot agree on who 
will serve in the panel within twenty days of the establishment of the 
panel, each party can request the Director-General to appoint its 
Members. The request shall be made before the Chairman of the DSB 
who has to notify the Director-General. The latter selects the panelists 
in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB, the Chairman of the 
relevant council or committee, and the parties to the dispute. The 
Chairman of the DSB shall inform the parties about the panel 
composition no later than ten days after he or she receives the request.  
The requirement embodied in the Decision on Certain Dispute 
Settlement Procedures for the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services85 improves the quality of panel reports. It takes into account 
the specific nature of the obligations and commitments in the 
Agreement regarding dispute settlement and establishes a special 
roster of panelists. The panelists from the roster may be governmental 
 
 
82 GALLAGHER, supra note 46, at 27. 
83 Though in practice Members seem to interpret this provision broadly and 
oppose nominations very often. 
84 Pescatore, supra note 76, at 30–31. 
85 Ministerial Decision adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee on 
December 15, 1993. The text of the decision can be found in: THE LEGAL TEXTS. THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 401 
(Cambridge University Press & WTO 1999). 
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or non-governmental individuals with experience in issues related to 
GATT and/or trade in services. The Decision requires panel members 
in sectoral matters to possess the necessary expertise concerning the 
sector involved.  
In accordance with Article 3.1 of the DSU,86 the WTO continues 
the GATT practice of providing preferential treatment to developing 
countries. Upon request, the DSU will require one panelist from a 
developing country to be included in the formation of a panel in 
disputes involving a developing country and a developed country. This 
provision ensures the independence of panel members and further 
guarantees that the panel will not issue a power-oriented report. 
 
C. Consultations 
 
The consultations procedure acts as a mandatory first step to the 
dispute settlement process and is further developed and codified by the 
DSU. In order to start the panel procedure, a trade dispute must exist. 
A dispute is defined as a difference of views between WTO Members 
concerning their rights and obligations under the “covered 
agreements” where one member alleges that an action, regulation, or 
policy (a “measure”) of another member is damaging its interests 
under the WTO Agreements. However, the existence of a difference 
by itself is not sufficient to start the procedure. A WTO dispute arises 
only if the complaining party notifies the DSB and the relevant 
councils and committees under Article 4.3 of the DSU. The DSU 
requires written requests for consultations stating the reasons for the 
request, the measures at issue, and the legal basis for the complaint.87 
The consultation aims at helping disputants reach a mutually 
acceptable solution; however, consultations must be conducted in good 
faith before resorting to any further action under the DSU, and 
Members should attempt to obtain satisfactory adjustment of the 
matter. 88  Within the panel process, the consultation gives the 
disputants an opportunity to exchange relevant information and to 
express their opinions. 
In contrast, the wording of the old GATT Article XXIII:1 89 
implies that consultations were not a prerequisite for the establishment 
of a panel. However, the 1979 Understanding, codifying the GATT 
customary practice, clarifies this misunderstanding by requiring 
consultations before resorting to the establishment of a panel. Under 
 
 
86 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.1. 
87 Id at art. 6.2, ¶¶ 1 and 2. 
88 Id. art. 4.5. 
89 GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXIII:1. 
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the GATT 1994, consultations may be initiated either pursuant to 
Article XXII:1 or XXIII:1. 90  If consultations are requested under 
Article XXIII:1 of GATT 1994, the complainant excludes the 
possibility of other Members participating in the consultations. 
However, if the request is made pursuant to Article XXII:1 of GATT 
1994, other Members with “substantial trade interest” in the matter 
may join the consultations if the respondent accepts them. Other 
multilateral agreements, such as GATS Article XXII:2 and Article 4, 
paragraphs 1 to 4, of the “Subsidies and Countervailing Agreement,”91 
etc., also provide for consultations. 
Compared to the consultations held within the old GATT, the new 
mechanism is more formalized. One improvement of the DSU is the 
time limit prescribed for consultation, in which a Member must 
respond to a request for consultations within ten days, and is required 
to enter into consultations within thirty days. If the consultations do 
not settle a dispute within sixty days from the receipt of the request, 
the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel. 
Furthermore, if the consulting parties jointly decide that the 
consultations cannot settle the dispute, then the complaining party is 
not required to wait for the sixty-day period to run. Likewise, if the 
Member concerned does not respond within ten days of the request, or 
does not enter into negotiations within thirty days of the receipt of the 
request, the complaining party may proceed directly to request the 
establishment of a panel.  
The DSU also provides shorter time limits for consultations in 
cases of urgency, such as disputes arising over perishable goods. The 
disputing parties have a duty to “accelerate the proceedings to the 
greatest extent possible”92 not only during the consultations, but also 
during the panel process. Members must enter into negotiations within 
a period of ten days after the receipt of the request for consultation and 
proceed to the establishment of a panel if consultations do not settle 
the dispute within twenty days of the request.  
The consultations are made without prejudice to the right of any 
Member in relation to the panel process; therefore, a complaint cannot 
use confidential information it received in the panel procedure as 
evidence against the respondent; however, the provision of Article 
 
 
90 GATT 1994, Annex 1 A to the WTO, April 15, 1994, 33 ILM 1154 (1994). 
91 E.g., the Subsidies and Countervailing Agreement provides additional 
requirements for consultations to those stated in the DSU. 
92 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 4.9. 
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4.693 should not be interpreted literally. If the disputants have kept a 
record of the topics addressed, they may use the record in the panel 
process as necessary evidence to assist the panel in concluding 
precisely what the consultations have covered. 
 
D. Terms of Reference and Panels’ Jurisdiction 
 
Although the old GATT did not provide any details on terms of 
reference, the 1979 Understanding improves and provides that the 
terms of reference are “to examine the matter and to make such 
findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the 
recommendations or rulings provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 
XXIII.”94 The DSU codifies and complements the GATT practice on 
this matter. Similarly, the standard terms of reference within the WTO 
provides that a panel shall examine the matter in light of the relevant 
provisions of the covered agreements and shall make such findings as 
will assist the DSB.95 The verb assist fits better under the old GATT 
because within the WTO, the reverse consensus rule for adoption of 
reports, panels, and the Appellate Body do more than merely assist the 
DSB.  
The terms of reference define the precise claim and determine 
what matters the panel is authorized to issue its report, e.g., on what 
subject and against which party. The panel is required to mention the 
measure complained of (governmental measure, regulation, law, or 
policy), and the legal basis of the claim (the provisions of the covered 
agreements concerned).  
The terms of reference also contain a notifying function, providing 
the respondent and the third parties in the panel process sufficient 
information of the claim in order to respond. No factual finding needs 
to be stated in the terms of reference because the claimant has the 
burden to prove or the respondent has the burden to rebut the facts of 
the case during the panel process.  
As a procedural matter, Article 6.2 of the DSU96 requires the 
complainant to state in the terms of reference whether consultations 
were held. The claimant prepares the terms of reference based on the 
matters discussed. Without prior consultations, a panel request may be 
dismissed because consultations are a first and mandatory step before 
 
 
93 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 4.6. Article 4.6 provides that, “[c]onsultations shall 
be confidential, and without prejudice to the rights of any Member in any further 
proceedings.” 
94 1979 Annex on the Customary Practice of the GATT, supra note 4, at ¶ 6(ii). 
95 WTO Agreement, supra note 3, Annex 2. 
96 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 6.2. 
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the panel process can even commence. Nevertheless, panels have no 
legal duty to make ex officio97 an enquiry on whether consultations 
have actually taken place because a case may be heard in the absence 
of consultations, so long as the respondent does not object. It is 
possible that consultations have not taken place because the Member 
failed to provide an answer within the ten day requirement or did not 
enter into consultations within the thirty day requirement. In such 
cases, the claimant may proceed directly to the establishment of a 
panel, but must explain the reason why consultations had not taken 
place. Direct resort to a panel will also be authorized if the other 
Member refuses consultations or if the disputants jointly decide that 
consultations will not resolve the matter. 
Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that a “brief summary of the legal 
basis of the complaint” and an identification of the specific measures 
at issue be provided in the terms of reference.98 This means that the 
relevant legal provisions should be stated in a specific and clear 
manner, allowing the respondent to organize a proper defense. For 
instance, since some of the provisions of GATT 1994 contain large 
compilations, a mere allegation of a violation of Article III will not 
fulfill the requirement for specificity under DSU Article 6.2. 99 
Specificity functions as a vital part of due process and the 
establishment of the defense by the respondent. Complainants must 
cite the relevant provisions of the covered agreements and refrain from 
positing arguments in the terms of reference to support their position. 
They must also understand the difference between a “claim” and an 
“argument.” A claim embodies an allegation that the respondent 
violated a specific provision of a covered agreement. In contrast, 
complainants put forth arguments to demonstrate the respondent’s 
violation of a specific provision. The claim is contained in the terms of 
reference, while the arguments support the claim and may be advanced 
until the end of the panel hearings.100 
The DSU does not demand exact identity between the specific 
measures identified in the request for consultations and those 
 
 
97 The term ex officio designates powers exercised by officials by virtue or 
because of the office they hold. 
98 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 6.2. 
99 Id.  
100 Appellate Body Report, Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of 
Certain Dairy Products, ¶ 139, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) (adopted Jan. 12, 
2000). 
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mentioned in the request for a panel. 101  Obviously, a measure 
unrelated to the consultations will not fulfill the mandatory 
consultation required before resorting to a panel; however, parties may 
subsequently readjust their scope of reference if new facts are 
discovered during consultations. These additional measures should 
correlate with the main issue that is subject to consultations. A request 
for the establishment of a panel on a matter, which is different from 
that discussed in the consultations, will likely be inadmissible, but will 
be decided on a case-by-case basis.  
Though ambiguous, Article 7.2 of the DSU102 requires panels to 
address the relevant provisions in the covered agreements cited by the 
parties to the dispute. Panels will consider the provisions mentioned in 
the terms of reference since the terms submitted by the complainant 
limit the panel’s jurisdiction. For this reason, a panel may not go 
beyond the subject of the terms of reference, and consider whether 
measures or actions complained of are inconsistent with other 
provisions of the covered agreements that are not cited. Even though 
some provisions are not mentioned in the terms of reference or raised 
during the proceedings, they can be considered by the panel, e.g., 
concerning special treatment of developing countries. 103  Similarly, 
when a complaint alleges a violation of a number of WTO provisions, 
panels are not obliged to address all the cited provisions. A panel may 
sufficiently address only those claims necessary to resolve the dispute, 
resulting in the exercise of judicial economy. 
A measure not mentioned in the terms of reference but that 
appears in a written submission is admissible if it is closely related to 
the measure involved, and if the respondent is given notice according 
to due process requirements.104 However, the panel will not consider 
 
 
101 This was re-affirmed by Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Export Financing 
Programme for Aircraft, ¶ 132, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) (adopted Aug. 20, 
1999). 
102 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 7.2. 
103 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 12.11. The DSU requires that panels “shall 
explicitly indicate the form in which account has been taken of the relevant provisions 
on differential and more favourable treatment for developing country Members.” 
104 Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and 
Paper, ¶ 10.8, WT/DS44/AB/R (Jan. 30, 1998) (adopted April 22, 1998).The panel 
noted:  
 
[t]o fall within the terms of Article 6.2, it seems clear that a 
“measure” not explicitly described in a panel request must have 
a clear relationship to a “measure” that is specifically described 
therein, so that it can be said to be “included” in the specified 
“measure.” In our view, the requirements of Article 6.2 would 
be met in the case of a “measure” that is subsidiary or so 
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an unrelated measure in a written submission. With regard to non-
violation complaints, if the request for the establishment of a panel 
fails to explicitly mention Article XXIII:1(b), the non-violation 
complaint will be excluded from the terms of reference. The WTO’s 
advantage over the old GATT system lies in the fact that the complaint 
requires no consent from the respondent. Under the old GATT, the 
terms of reference had to be agreed upon by the parties, which 
provided a good incentive for the respondent to delay the proceedings. 
For example, in Japan – Agricultural Products, Japan refused to 
accept the standard terms of reference due to concerns that “the panel 
would follow strictly legal reasoning, without including the relevant 
political considerations.”105 Therefore, the value of the DSU rests in 
its recognition of the right of the complainant to use standard terms of 
reference regardless of the respondent's consent under Article 6.3. 
The essential significance of the terms of reference is well 
illustrated by an example from EC–Tariff Preferences.106 This marks 
the first case submitted to the WTO dispute settlement system 
concerning tariff preferences for developing countries. The 
Contracting Parties' Decision on Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment was adopted in 1979. 107  Before this case, the precise 
relationship between GATT Article I:1 and the Enabling Clause, 
embodied in the Decision on More Favourable Treatment, was 
unclear. Normally, when a provision makes an exception to the 
substantive provisions of covered agreements, the burden of proof 
rests on the party who invokes the application of such an exception. 
Articles XX and XXI of GATT 1994 contain examples of these types 
of exceptions. Thus in preparing its claim, the complainant likely 
views the Enabling Clause as an exception, and consequently fails to 
mention it in the terms of reference.  
 
 
closely related to a “measure” specifically identified, that the 
responding party can reasonably be found to have received 
adequate notice of the scope of the claims asserted by the 
complaining party. 
 
105 Report of the Panel, Japan—Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural 
Products, L/6253, (Nov. 18, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 163 (1989). 
106 Panel Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries (EC— Tariff Preferences), WT/DS246/R (Oct. 
28, 2003). 
107 GATT Secretariat, Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, 
and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979) 
[hereinafter Decision on More Favourable Treatment]. 
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In this case, the Appellate Body reversed the finding of the panel 
as to who bore the burden of proof regarding the Enabling Clause. The 
Appellate Body observed that: 
 
[A] complaining party challenging a measure taken 
pursuant to the Enabling Clause must allege more 
than mere inconsistency of the GATT 1994, for to do 
only that would not convey the legal basis of the 
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. In 
other words, it is insufficient in the WTO dispute 
settlement for a complainant to allege inconsistency 
with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 if the complainant 
seeks also to argue that the measure is not justified 
under the Enabling Clause.108  
 
Thus if the complainant does not identify the Enabling Clause in 
its claim, the panel lacks authority to find a violation of that clause not 
mentioned in the terms of reference. Therefore, parties should 
anticipate all possible scenarios and write them into the terms of 
reference. 
One of the panelists in a dissenting opinion,109 however, stated 
that the claim had not been brought under the proper provisions and 
had to be dismissed. In his/her view, the Enabling Clause was not an 
affirmative defense to GATT Article I:1; rather, the complainant bore 
the burden of proving a violation of the Enabling Clause.110 Therefore, 
the complaint had to be brought not under GATT Article I:1, but under 
the Enabling Clause. In practical terms, India would have lost its case 
if this view had been shared by a majority of the panel. 
The jurisdiction of WTO panels is a significant feature in the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism because the panel’s jurisdiction 
determines and limits the scope of the Appellate Body. The DSU 
stipulates that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Body “shall be limited 
to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations 
developed by the panel.” 111  The Appellate Body has stated on 
numerous occasions that a panel’s consideration of the evidence, 
 
 
108 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, ¶ 110, WT/DS246/AB/R 
(Apr. 4, 2004) (adopted April 20, 2004). 
109 See Panel Report, European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of 
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries (EC—Tariff Preferences), WT/DS246/R 
(Dec. 1, 2003) (dissenting opinion by one member of the panel, at 152–157). 
110 Id. at 156–59.  
111 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 17.6. 
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including its decision on whether a prima facie case has been 
established, falls outside the scope of the appeal proceedings. The 
Appellate Body only reviews issues of law. Appellate proceedings do 
not normally examine factual issues; therefore, an issue not covered by 
the panel analysis will normally fall outside the scope of appellate 
review.  
In some instances, the Appellate Body has refused to “complete 
the legal analysis” when the facts had been gathered in the panel 
process. The panel in EC – Asbestos112 found that the “prohibitive 
part” of the French Decree did not fall within the scope of the 
“Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBT).113 However, its 
articles providing exceptions to the asbestos ban did fall within the 
TBT. The Appellate Body reversed the panel’s finding that the TBT 
Agreement did not apply to the part of the Decree regarding the 
asbestos ban and concluded that the measure, viewed as an integrated 
whole, constituted a technical regulation under the TBT Agreement. 
Hence, both the ban itself and the exceptions provided in the French 
Decree fell within the scope of the TBT. Normally, one would think 
that the Appellate Body could have completed the legal analysis and 
examined the consistency of the measure with the TBT agreement; 
however, the Appellate Body refused to complete the legal analysis. 
Finally, the Appellate Body came to the conclusion that, “[w]ith this 
particular collection of circumstances in mind, we consider that we do 
not have an adequate basis properly to examine Canada's claims under 
Article 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 and 2.8 of the TBT Agreement and, accordingly, 
we refrain from so doing.”114 It seems that, among other reasons, the 
major concern of the Appellate Body was the “novel character” of the 
TBT Agreement. It is evident that the disputing parties advanced the 
necessary facts in the panel and appeal proceedings, and that the 
claimant (Canada) made its claims under the TBT Agreement. 
Therefore, the Appellate Body’s conclusion contradicts the well-
established principle of law Jura novit curia (it is up to the court to 
know the law).115 Furthermore, whether the panel did not make any 
 
 
112 Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos Containing Products (EC-Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, DSR 2001:VIII, 
3305 [hereinafter Measures Affecting Asbestos]. 
113 Agreement to Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Annex 1 to the WTO 
Agreement, supra note 3 [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. 
114 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) (adopted 
April 5, 2001). 
115 For an in-depth analysis of the EC–Asbestos case, the application of the TBT 
Agreement, and a critical approach to the Appellate Body’s findings, see Joost 
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findings on the issue or not is contestable because it held that the 
“prohibitive part” of the decree did not fall within the scope of the 
TBT Agreement, while the exceptions did.  
This example illustrates the importance of the scope of panel 
jurisdiction and the significance of parties making precise requests and 
arguments to the panel during panel proceedings. If a party has not 
given all pertinent facts during the panel proceedings, they will be 
unable to do so during the appeal procedure. Even if a party has 
presented certain facts and arguments, the Appellate Body may find 
itself unable to complete the legal analysis.  
 
E. Types of Complaints 
 
Analysis of the varying types of complaints illustrates that the 
WTO dispute settlement system is broader than other international 
dispute settlement systems, which adjudicate only violations of 
agreements. The intent to maintain the negotiated balance of 
concessions and benefits between WTO Members demonstrates the 
peculiarity of the system.116  
Although the conditions for the submission of a legal complaint 
are provided in the DSU, the legal basis for a complaint is the alleged 
violation of individually covered agreements. The WTO Agreement 
clearly illustrates that the GATT 1994 is “legally distinct” from the 
GATT 1947,117 but the grounds to bring a complaint under the GATT 
1994 are technically the same as the requirements indicated in Article 
XXIII of the GATT 1947. This is because the reference to “contracting 
party” in the provisions of GATT 1994 bears the same meaning as 
“member” in Article XXIII of the GATT 1947. Article XXIII, which 
has been the basis of the development of the old GATT dispute 
settlement mechanism for more than 47 years, remains unchanged in 
the GATT 1994. It provides for three kinds of complaints: (1) 
violation complaints, (2) non-violation complaints, and (3) situation 
complaints. 
 
 
 
 
Pauwelyn, Cross-agreement Complaints before the Appellate Body: A Case Study of 
the EC-Asbestos Dispute, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 63 (2002). 
116 HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 31. 
117 The GATT 1994 consists of: GATT 1947; a number of legal instruments that 
have entered into force under the GATT 1947 before the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement such as protocols and certifications relating to tariff concessions, 
protocols of accession, decisions on waivers granted under Article XXV of GATT 
1947; and decisions of the contracting parties to GATT 1947. It also includes six 
interpretation understandings and the Marrakesh Protocol to GATT 1994. 
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1. Violation complaints 
 
“Violation complaints” require failure on the part of another 
Member to carry out its obligations, which results in nullification or 
impairment of a benefit or impediment of the attainment of any 
objective.118 The complainant must contend that another Member has 
failed to carry out its obligations under GATT 1994. For example, that 
a violation of a rule has occurred, which causes an impairment (or 
nullification) of the benefits of a covered agreement. 119  Once a 
Member establishes a breach of a WTO obligation, the breach triggers 
the presumption that the violation causes nullification or impairment 
of benefits. Consequently, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent, 
who must rebut the charge. This presumption relates only to the result 
which a measure causes. For example, if a measure is in violation of a 
WTO rule, it is presumed that it results in nullification or impairment 
of benefits or impedes the objective of a covered agreement. Thus a 
complainant must demonstrate a prima facie violation of a provision of 
GATT 1994.  
Only then does the presumption that such violation causes 
nullification or impairment of benefits arise.120 The wording of the 
provision codified in paragraph 5 of the 1979 Annex on the Customary 
Practice to GATT and embodied in Article 3.8 of the DSU implies that 
the presumption is rebuttable;121 however, this has never been done, 
neither within the old GATT nor the WTO. 
 
2. Non-violation complaints 
 
“Non-violation complaints” require the existence of a measure 
applied by another WTO Member, even if it does not conflict with 
GATT 1994, provided that it results in “nullification or impairment of 
a benefit.”122 The complexities of international trade relations explain 
such basis for a complaint. The provision aims at securing the balance 
of concessions between WTO Members, since a trade commitment 
 
 
118 See Art. XXIII:1, GATT 1994, Annex 1 A to the WTO, 33 ILM 1154 (1994). 
119 Or respectively a violation which causes an impediment of the attainment of 
any objective of the agreement. However, this second cause of action has been used 
significantly less often in the old GATT and now in the WTO. 
120 This presumption was codified in the 1979 Annex on the Customary Practice 
to GATT. See 1979 Annex on the Customary Practice to GATT, supra note 4, at ¶ 5. 
The DSU embodies the presumption in Article 3.8. See DSU, supra note 22, at art. 
3.8. 
121 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.8. 
122 GATT 1994, at art. XXIII:1(b). 
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may be frustrated, not only by a measure which is in breach of a WTO 
rule, but also by a measure consistent with the covered agreements. 
State responsibility for injurious acts, which are not prohibited by 
international law, is subject to debate.123 In WTO law, the situation is 
somewhat different. Article 26.1 of the DSU extends and develops the 
relevant GATT provision. Non-violation complaints were admitted in 
the old GATT and rightly remain admissible in the new dispute 
settlement mechanism. The WTO, on the other hand, has a more 
complete set of rules and may fill gaps when a measure otherwise not 
prohibited by the agreements impairs trade benefits. The burden to 
prove “non-violation” complaints is heavier. Three conditions must be 
proved: (1) the application of a measure by a WTO Member, (2) the 
existence of a benefit under a WTO agreement, 124  and (3) the 
nullification or impairment of a benefit due to the application of the 
measure.125  
Additionally, the complainant has to present a “detailed 
justification” to support the claim and must explicitly state in the terms 
of reference that the claim relates to Article XXIII: 1(b). The panel can 
only recommend an adjustment and not a withdrawal of the measure. 
It is noteworthy that the Panel in Japan – Photographic Film and 
Paper inferred that a “non-violation complaint” must refer to some 
actual harm to the complainant since, in any event, the latter must 
demonstrate that the measure does in fact result in nullification or 
impairment of expected benefits. 126  In contrast, a “violation 
complaint” does not require proof from the complainant of actual harm 
because of the presumption mentioned above. There were only twenty-
four non-violation cases from 1947 to 1990 within the old GATT; only 
 
 
123 The ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility provide that every 
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that 
State. The articles further provide that if the conduct of a state constitutes a breach of 
an international obligation, there is an internationally wrongful act. See Report of the 
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No.10), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 
124 GATT jurisprudence has linked such a benefit with reasonable expectations 
for improved market opportunities due to the concession granted. However, this 
condition poses a number of legal problems. It is an open question whether such 
reasonable expectations may be attributable to a third country which did not actually 
negotiate the tariff concession with the complainant. Likewise, it is unclear how long 
such expectations would last. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 364 (3d ed. 1995). 
125 This is due to the fact that the presumption of “nullification and impairment 
of benefits” applicable to “violation complaints” does not apply to “non-violation” and 
“situation complaints.” 
126 Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and 
Paper, ¶ 10.60, WT/DS44/AB/R (Mar. 31, 1998) (adopted Apr. 22, 1998). 
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seven resulted in affirmative panel rulings, and only three were 
adopted by the GATT Council. 
 
3. Situation complaints 
 
“Situation complaints,” listed in Article XXIII:1(c) of GATT 
1994, regard any situation that results in “nullification or impairment 
of a benefit” (or impediment for the attainment of the objective of the 
agreement). 127  They cover “any other situation” act, or omission, 
different from a measure, which does not infringe on a provision of 
GATT 1994 or other covered agreements. Situation complaints have 
been designed to eliminate possible non-tariff barriers to trade. No 
GATT panel has ever based its legal finding on such a claim under the 
GATT. Trade experts have criticized the availability of “situation 
complaints” in GATT 1994. Taking into account the vague language 
of GATT Article XXIII:1(c) and the “lack of predictable and 
justifiable standards for interpreting,” E.-U. Petersmann considers this 
imprecise type of complaint useless and supports its formal 
abolition. 128  P. Pescatore suggests that the “legal fantasy” called 
“situation complaints” should be erased.129 However, the WTO system 
did not abolish this type of complaint, but provided some additional 
requirements. Except for a detailed justification provided by the 
complainant, if a case also involves matters other than those related to 
a situation complaint, Article 26.2(b) of the DSU requires that the 
panel issue a report addressing those matters (i.e., those regarding a 
violation or a non-violation complaint) and a separate report on the 
matters that specifically concern the “situation complaint.” 
Additionally, the DSU prescribes a special procedure for 
“situation complaints,” which was applied during the last years of the 
old GATT on a provisional basis pursuant to the 1989 Contracting 
Parties’ Decision.130 The general procedure provided for in the DSU 
is applicable only until the panel report is circulated to the parties. 
However, the special procedure provided in the Decision applies to the 
subsequent stages following the completion of the panel report; i.e., 
these special rules apply in lieu of the DSU with regard to adoption, 
surveillance, and implementation of a consensual panel report on a 
 
 
127 GATT 1994, at art. XXIII:1(c). 
128 Petersmann, supra note 8, at 173–76. 
129 Pescatore, supra note 76, at 41. But see GALLAGHER, supra note 46, at 17 
(finding that not only “situation complaints,” but also “non-violation complaints” are 
“exotic”). 
130 Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures (Apr. 
12, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1989). 
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“situation complaint.” Therefore, the adoption of a panel report on a 
situation complaint under the current regime requires the positive 
consensus of all WTO Members. Considering all these peculiarities 
regarding “situation complaints,” it is likely that these types of 
complaints will not arise in the near future. 
The possibility of bringing a “non-violation” or “situation 
complaint” indicates that the WTO dispute settlement is broader than 
other international dispute settlement systems, which adjudicate only 
violations of agreements. The peculiarity of the system is explained by 
the intent to maintain the negotiated balance of concessions and 
benefits between WTO Members.131 The three types of complaints 
mentioned above, “violation,” “non-violation,” and “situation 
complaints,” may allege that a measure has caused either “nullification 
or impairment of a benefit” or “impediment for the attainment of the 
objective of the GATT.”132 Since these three types of actions may 
result in two different consequences independently of each other, E.-
U. Petersmann finds six different types of complaints to exist. 133 
Nullification is a sub-category of an impairment, since it completely 
impairs the benefits from the GATT 1994 or from other covered 
agreements. 
 
4. Types of complaints provided in other covered agreements 
 
In addition, there are some differences between the existing WTO 
system and the GATT system. The types of complaints provided for in 
other multilateral agreements on trade of goods are identical to the 
complaints in GATT 1994, as they make references to Articles XXII 
and XIII of GATT 1994.134 If a complaint is brought under a covered 
agreement other than GATT 1994, the complaint must refer to the 
relevant agreement for failure to carry out a WTO obligation or for the 
impairment of a benefit. 
Under the current regime, a claim can be based not only on an 
inconsistency related to the trade of goods, as was the case under the 
old GATT, but also on any nullification or impairment of benefits 
from agreements of trades in services and intellectual property rights, 
 
 
131 HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 31. 
132 Art. XXIII:1, GATT 1994, Annex 1 A to the WTO, 33 I.L.M 1154 (1994). 
133 Petersmann, supra note 13, at 72–74. However, complaints brought on the 
basis of an allegation of “impediment for the attainment of the objective of the GATT” 
have been used considerably less frequently within the GATT and now within the 
WTO. 
134 The Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods are embodied in Annex 1A 
to the WTO Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994).  
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and on rights related to the WTO Agreement and the DSU. However, 
the GATS distinguishes between only two kinds of complaints—
“violation complaints” and “non-violation complaints.”135 The former 
does not require nullification or impairment of benefits,136 and thus 
there is no need to trigger the presumption of Article 3.8 of the 
DSU.137  
The “non-violation” complaint under the GATS is technically the 
same as that of GATT 1994, except that GATS Article XXIII:3 is 
more specific. It requires that an impairment or nullification result in a 
benefit, which the Member “could reasonably have expected to accrue 
to it under a specific commitment of another Member.” 138  This 
condition is elaborated by the GATT jurisprudence on “non-violation” 
cases, and GATS Article XXIII:3 currently specifies this condition. 
Under GATT 1994 and the old GATT regime, if the claimant 
succeeds in proving a non-violation complaint, the respondent is not 
obliged to withdraw the measure, but can make an adjustment. In 
contrast, GATS Article XXIII:3 provides that a satisfactory adjustment 
may include not only a modification of the measure, but also its 
withdrawal. Therefore, the GATS offers an additional legal remedy 
with regards to non-violation complaints (withdrawal of the measure) 
and does not provide for a “situation complaint.” 
Although the TRIPS presents the possibility of bringing all types 
of complaints provided in Article XXIII of GATT 1994 forward, 
Article 64(3) of the TRIPS specifies that the provisions for “non-
violation” and “situation complaints” do not apply in the first five 
years of entering into the WTO Agreement. Therefore, the TRIPS 
Council is not able to examine the scope and modalities for such 
complaints, and may not submit recommendations to the Ministerial 
Conference. Even though these recommendations have not been 
submitted, WTO Members have brought “non-violation” and 
“situation complaints” under the TRIPS.  
 
 
135 GATS, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994), at art. XXIII. 
136 See GATS art. XXIII:1, 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994) at 1183. 
137 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.8 provides: 
 
In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed 
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to 
constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that there 
is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse 
impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, and in 
such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint 
has been brought to rebut the charge. 
 
138 GATS art. XXIII:3, supra note 136. 
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Finally, a complaint based on a violation of the DSU and the WTO 
Agreement is permissible.139 In a recent case, a claimant alleged a 
violation of Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement,140 but had not 
established it during the proceedings. In another recent case, US – 
Safeguards,141 the Appellate Body found a violation of Article 11 of 
the DSU. 
The DSU does not permit counter-claims because the use of 
dispute settlement procedures is not considered a “contentious act,” 
and complaints and counter-complaints should not be linked.142 For 
example, in Mexico – Soft Drinks, as Mexico attempted to link a WTO 
dispute to another dispute between the same parties under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the panel emphasized that 
under Article 3.10 of the DSU, 143  Members should not link 
“complaints and counter-complaints in regard to distinct matters.”144 
The object of a complaint may be a “measure” in the sense of a 
positive action, such as a violation of a law or regulation, or even a 
decision attributable to the government. It may be inaction when a 
WTO rule requires a positive action. A “measure” may be any act of a 
WTO Member, even if it is not binding, including governmental 
administrative guidance.145  
 
 
 
 
139 See WTO Agreement, supra note 3, at arts. I–XIV. 
140 Appellate Body Report, United States–Laws, Regulations and Methodology 
for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), ¶ 23, WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 
2006) (adopted May 9, 2006). 
141 Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Wheat Gluten from the EC, ¶ 187, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 2000). 
142 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.10, last phrase. 
143 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.10. 
144 Panel Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶ 
7.15, WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005). 
145 This was confirmed in Japan–Semiconductors. In that case, the Japanese 
Government contended that the measures complained of were not restrictions within 
the meaning of GATT Article XI:1, because they were not legally binding or 
mandatory (¶¶ 106–08). The panel found that non-binding measures would be 
operating in a manner equivalent to mandatory requirements, so that the difference 
between the measures and mandatory requirements would be “only one of form and 
not of substance” (¶ 109). Hence, it concluded that the Japanese Government's 
measures did not need to be legally binding to take effect, as there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that there were sufficient incentives for Japanese producers and 
exporters to conform (¶ 111). Therefore, the Japanese administrative guidance was 
found to be in violation of GATT Article XI:1. Report of the Panel, Japan—Trade in 
Semi-conductors, ¶¶ 106, 109, L/6309 (May 4, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 
116 (1989). 
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5. Multiple complaints 
 
Trade measures adopted by a Member often adversely affect 
numerous WTO Members. This explains why more than one Member 
may request the establishment of a panel on the same subject matter, 
i.e., there may be multiple complainants. Article 9.1 of the DSU 
provides that, whenever feasible, one single panel should examine 
these complaints, taking into account the rights of all complainants.146 
However, if a considerable amount of time elapses between the filing 
of the different complaints, then the establishment of a single panel is 
not feasible.  
If several panels have been set up on the same subject matter, 
Article 9.3 of the DSU provides that the same individuals should serve 
on each of the panels and the timetables should be synchronized.147 
This rule aims at providing consistency of legal interpretation in the 
panel reports and avoiding contradictory panel rulings on the same 
subject matter. 
 
F. Written Submissions and Hearings 
 
The DSU codifies the established practice of GATT panels 
regarding panel hearings and written submissions. Article 12 of the 
DSU and its Appendix 3 on Working Procedures determine the 
procedural phases and time limits from the establishment of a panel 
until the issuance of its report. As a general rule, the timeframe may 
not exceed six months. In cases of urgency, including those relating to 
perishable goods, the panel is required to issue its report to the parties 
involved in the dispute within three months. In order to respect the 
deadlines of this time-sensitive process, the DSU prescribes rigorous 
time limits and establishes control over the panel. 
The WTO system’s superior consistency and unification in the 
overall function of panels surpasses that of the GATT’s systems. 
Panels within the old GATT had to set up their individual working 
procedures. As of 1985, panels had to follow the Suggested Working 
Procedures, unless the Members of the panel agreed otherwise after 
consulting the parties to the dispute. 148  Normally, GATT panels 
received two sets of written submissions and held two substantive 
meetings with the parties. WTO panels follow the established GATT 
practice, which started in the 1980s, after the creation of a Legal 
Office within the GATT Secretariat. A legal officer is assigned in each 
 
 
146 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 9.1. 
147 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 9.3. 
148 1989 Contracting Parties’ Decision, supra note 23, at ¶ F(f)(2). 
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case and attends all panel meetings. Their responsibility is to assist and 
advise the panelists on procedural and substantive legal questions. 
This practice deserves support since WTO legal officers and 
professionals are aware of how all the panels proceed. Furthermore, 
legal officers never intervene in the oral meetings unless invited to do 
so, but they are limited to only advising the panelist, who take 
responsibility in making their final decision. 
Within the WTO, a panel first holds a short procedural meeting 
(organizational meeting) with the parties, establishing the schedule for 
the panel proceedings. The panel decides the time limits on the first 
written submissions, the date of the first substantive meeting, the due 
dates of written replies to questions by the panel, the date for 
submission of the second written statements, the second substantive 
meeting, and so forth. Panels are obligated to adopt the working 
procedure and the timetable within one week after the panel is 
composed. 
 
1. The first written submissions 
 
Under the GATT practice, parties generally submitted their first 
written statements simultaneously, but under the WTO, the 
complainant must submit the first written submission in advance 
(within three to six weeks) of the responding party’s submission.149 In 
addition, the DSU in Appendix 3 prescribes detailed working 
procedures with strict time limits.150. Both parties have to present the 
facts of the case and their arguments in the written submissions. After 
receipt of the complaining party’s submission, the respondent has two 
or three weeks to transmit its first written submission to the panel. This 
sequence of submitting a brief in advance is superior to simultaneous 
submission because it allows the respondent to receive notice of the 
facts and legal arguments regarding the alleged WTO inconsistency in 
order to organize its defense.  
The first written submission of the complainant contains more 
detailed factual and legal arguments than the request for the 
establishment of a panel. A panel has no authority to examine a claim 
that was not included in the panel request because it is beyond the 
panel’s terms of reference. The purpose of the first submission of the 
 
 
149 Appendix 3 to the DSU, Working Procedures, supra note 22, at ¶ 12 (a). 
Additionally, during the proceedings, panels follow the DSU and the Understandings 
and Decisions of the GATT Contracting Parties of 1979, 1982, 1984, and 1989. These 
documents (except the DSU) are reproduced in 2 GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE 
TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE (WTO 1995), at 632–42. 
150 See Appendix 3 to the DSU, Working Procedures, supra note 22. 
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complainant is to substantiate the claim advanced, while the 
respondent's first written submission is to refute the allegations and 
arguments of the complainant. The submissions are kept confidential, 
but parties may decide to disclose their submissions to the public 
pursuant to Article 18.2 of the DSU.151 
 
2. The first substantive meeting 
 
The WTO system is significantly more open than the GATT 
system. After the parties exchange first written submissions, the panel 
holds the first substantive meeting within approximately two weeks. 
Under the old GATT regime as well as under the WTO, the panel 
meetings are not open to the public.152 At the first substantive meeting, 
the complainant is asked to present its case, in which the complainant 
usually makes an opening statement that describes the history of the 
dispute and explains the merits of the case. Then the respondent is 
asked to present its point of view. During the presentation, the 
respondent advances arguments in order to defend its own measures. 
The panelists, usually through the chairman, may ask questions at any 
time to clarify certain situations or to ask for more factual information. 
After each session, the parties provide each other with copies of their 
oral statements. 
The Working Procedures is not considered an “all-encompassing” 
list of procedures, but “simply general procedures designed to assist 
the panel.”153 However, panels are not authorized to disregard explicit 
provisions of the DSU. For example, in India–Patents, the 
complainant tried to advance a new claim under TRIPS Article 63 at 
the first substantive meeting.154 Although the respondent objected that 
the claim was not within the terms of reference, the panel held that all 
legal claims would be considered if they were made prior to the first 
substantive meeting. The Appellate Body reversed the panel’s decision 
by finding that it was not consistent with the letter and spirit of the 
DSU. It further noted that:  
 
Although panels enjoy some discretion in establishing 
their own working procedures, this discretion does not 
extend to modifying the substantive provisions of the 
 
 
151 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 18.2. 
152 See Appendix 3 to the DSU, Working Procedures, supra note 22, at 1245, ¶ 2. 
153 YANG GUOHUA, BRYAN MERCURIO & LI YONGJIE, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
UNDERSTANDING: A DETAILED INTERPRETATION 145 (2005). 
154 Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sep. 5, 1997). 
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DSU…Nothing in the DSU gives a panel the authority 
either to disregard or to modify other explicit 
provisions of the DSU. The jurisdiction of a panel is 
established by that panel’s terms of reference, which 
are governed by Article 7 of the DSU…A panel cannot 
assume jurisdiction that it does not have.155  
 
After oral statements, parties are invited to respond to questions 
posed by the panel or the opposing party. Questions are typically 
distributed in written form, and parties may reserve the right to answer 
and respond in written form until they receive authorization from their 
respective governments to answer specific questions. The parties 
usually submit written answers to the panel and to the other party, 
even if the question was discussed at the hearing. The deliberations of 
the panel and the documents submitted to it are confidential.156 For 
this reason, third parties are not entitled to receive documents from the 
proceedings, except the first written submissions. The 1979 Annex on 
the Customary Practice of the GATT provides that written memoranda 
submitted to the panel are considered confidential, but are made 
available to the parties involved in the dispute.157 The DSU makes an 
effort to reduce the confidentiality of the process, only allowing 
Members to treat information submitted by another member as 
confidential information.158 Also, in order to promote transparency in 
the panel process, the Appendix specifies that if a party submits 
confidential information in its written submissions to the panel, it 
shall, upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential summary 
that the public may view.159 
Moreover, under the DSU, panel reports are automatically binding 
when coupled with the prospect of appellate review, enticing panelists 
to write more elaborate and comprehensive analysis than those made 
within the GATT. This regulation induces disputing parties to use 
every possible avenue in securing more favourable rulings, including 
the usage of various procedural objections put forward by the 
disputing parties.  
The WTO dispute settlement system is significantly more 
formalized than the previous GATT mechanism, but not to the extent 
of civil procedures in the majority of national legal systems. Panels 
 
 
155 Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶ 92, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997). 
156 DSU, supra note 22, at 1245, app. 3, ¶ 3. 
157 See 1979 Annex on the Customary Practices of the GATT, supra note 4. 
158 DSU, supra note 22, at 1245, app. 3, ¶ 3. 
159 Id. 
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should always consider the principle of good faith when conducting 
the panel process. Failure of a complainant to strictly comply with the 
procedural rules in requesting a panel does not necessarily void the 
process; rather, the panel will likely give additional time to the 
complainant to remove the discrepancies.  
A notable preliminary objection raised by the United States in the 
panel proceedings relating to U.S.–Foreign Sales Corporations 
illustrates this principle of good faith.160 In this case, the respondent 
contended that the European Communities’ claim should be dismissed 
because the request for consultations did not include a “statement of 
available evidence” as required by Article 4.2 of the Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM). The United States further contended 
that the request was defective because it could not form the basis for a 
panel proceeding. The panel rejected the preliminary objection stating 
that no specific provision of the DSU or the SCM Agreement would 
require dismissal of a claim under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement as 
a consequence of failure to comply with Article 4.2.161 
On appeal, the United States insisted that the consequence of a 
failure to include a “statement of available evidence” under Article 4.2 
of the SCM Agreement had to be the dismissal of the European 
Communities’ claim under Article 3 of the same agreement. The 
Appellate Body found the requirement of Article 4.2 supplemented the 
conditions of Article 4.4 of the DSU. Since the issue of whether a 
measure is a prohibited subsidy often requires a detailed examination 
of facts, they decided the request for consultations had to satisfy the 
requirements of both provisions. The Appellate Body further observed 
that this requirement presented “available evidence of the character of 
the measure as ‘subsidy’ that must be indicated, and not merely 
evidence of the existence of the measure.”162 
Despite the defect in the request for consultations, the Appellate 
Body recognized that the United States had still participated in 
them.163 The first occasion in which the United States objected to the 
request for consultations was in the panel proceedings. The Appellate 
 
 
160 Panel Report, United States—Tax Treatment of “Foreign Sales 
Corporations,” (FSC), WT/DS108/R, (Oct. 8, 1999), as modified by the Appellate 
Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment of Foreign Sales Corporations (FCS), 
WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000) (adopted on Mar. 20, 2000). 
161 Panel Report, United States—Tax Treatment of “Foreign Sales 
Corporations,” (FSC), WT/DS108/R, (Oct. 8, 1999), at ¶ 7.10. 
162 Appellate Body Report, Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax 
Treatment of Foreign Sales Corporations (FCS), WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000) 
(adopted on Mar. 20, 2000), at ¶ 161. 
163 And perhaps, as the panel asserted, the respondent consciously chose not to 
seek clarification. Panel Report, supra note 161, at ¶ 7.10. 
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Body rejected this objection because the respondent had various 
opportunities to raise objections during consultations that lasted almost 
a year. More significantly, the United States did not raise the objection 
during the two DSB meetings where request for the establishment of a 
panel was on the agenda. For this reason, the United States acted as if 
it had accepted the establishment of the panel. Consequently, the 
United State’s behavior exemplified the meaning of an estoppel. 
In an effort to reduce frivolous objections, the Appellate Body 
emphasizes that both the complainant and the respondent possess an 
obligation to comply with the requirements of the DSU and other 
covered agreements in good faith and added: 
 
By good faith compliance, complaining Members 
accord to the responding Members the full measure of 
protection and opportunity to defend, contemplated by 
the letter and spirit of the procedural rules. The same 
principle of good faith requires that responding 
Members seasonably and promptly bring claimed 
procedural deficiencies to the attention of the 
Complaining Member, and to the DSB or the Panel, so 
that correction, if needed, can be made to resolve 
disputes. The procedural rules of WTO dispute 
settlement are designed to promote, not the 
development of litigation techniques, but simply the 
fair, prompt and effective resolution of trade 
disputes.164 
 
Thus the current WTO system provides a higher level of 
transparency, though the overall increased complexity from the 
additional procedural objections might leave some yearning for the 
more simple GATT procedures. 
 
3. Second written submissions 
 
After the first substantive meeting, the parties have two to three 
weeks to send their second written submissions. During this time, 
parties have the opportunity to respond to the first written submission 
of the other party and to rebut the facts and arguments advanced by it 
at the first substantive meeting. Unlike the first written submissions, 
 
 
164 Appellate Body Report, United States—Tax Treatment of Foreign Sales 
Corporations (FCS), WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000) (adopted on Mar. 20, 2000), at 
¶ 166. 
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the second written submissions have to be sent in by the parties at the 
same time. 
 
4. The second substantive meeting 
 
After the panel has determined a broad outline of the case in the 
first meeting, it reconvenes for a second substantive meeting with the 
parties. This meeting, which is usually held within one month of 
receiving the second written submission rebuttals, provides another 
opportunity for the panel to engage in fact-finding with the parties.165 
Having this second opportunity to ensure the facts are correct is 
important because the Appellate Body will review only points of law. 
Though the purpose of the first substantive meeting is mainly about 
noting the issues in which the panel is concerned and of the arguments 
of the other party, the second substantive meeting provides a forum in 
which the parties can concentrate the debate on specific disagreements 
on the facts or on legal interpretation.166 
As mentioned earlier, the current process is becoming less 
concerned with confidentiality than the earlier agreements. Paragraph 
10 of Appendix 3 of the Working Procedures to the DSU commands 
“in the interest of full transparency” that all presentations, rebuttals, 
and statements be made in the presence of the other party. 167 
Moreover, each party’s written submissions, including any comments 
on the descriptive part of the report and responses to questions put by 
the panel, shall be made available to the other party or parties.168 
 
 
165 However, the Working Procedure states that the second substantive meeting 
should be held one to two weeks after the receipt of the rebuttals. DSU, supra note 22, 
Appendix 3, at ¶ 12(d). 
166 Hudec suggests a further legalization of the panel process in regard to the 
panel hearing. In his view, similarly to hearings at national courts, panels should 
question the parties on the most vulnerable points of their argumentation. Currently, 
based on the GATT legacy, the panels serve to assist the disputing parties, and there is 
considerable control on behalf of the parties on the panel proceeding. “The best way to 
develop the facts is to obtain the parties’ agreement to them, and this usually requires 
questioning by the panel to fill in the gaps – questioning that the party being 
questioned would often prefer not to answer fairly and fully: Full development of the 
legal side of the case often requires similar questioning, just as judges in civil 
litigation find it valuable to sharpen their understanding of legal issues by probing 
apparent weak points in each party’s legal arguments.” Robert E. Hudec, The New 
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years, PSIO 
Occasional Paper, WTO Series Number 11, IUHEI–Geneva 1998 at 50 [hereinafter An 
Overview]. 
167 DSU, supra note 22, at 1246, app. 3, ¶ 10. 
168 Id.  
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One of the main proposals for reform in the panel process is to 
open panel hearings to the public. Since this process is confidential 
under the current regime, such a proposal implies a major change to 
the system. While this change may increase the legitimacy of the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism, it is likely to have a negative 
impact on the party’s behavior because it would not contribute to 
reaching a “positive solution” to a dispute, which is the major aim of 
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Furthermore, the parties will 
be reluctant to publicly submit confidential business information. 
Moreover, if things work well, there is no need to change them. This 
kind of practice could be supported, however, if the disputing parties 
see no obstacles in making the hearings of a particular dispute public. 
Moreover, Member States should be encouraged to follow this kind of 
practice, as it will make the panel process more transparent.169 
Whether confidential or not, the second substantive meeting 
usually marks the end of submitting any further written submissions, 
though there are some occasions where the parties have been allowed 
to send a third set of written submissions due to unusual 
circumstances.170 
Such was the case in EC – Customs, where the claimant (the 
United States) presented new evidence at the second substantive 
meeting. The European Communities argued that the evidence 
contained in section III of the United States' oral statement was “new,” 
submitted too late, and should therefore be found inadmissible by the 
panel. The United States asserted that the evidence constituted 
“evidence necessary for the purposes of rebuttals” within the meaning 
of paragraph 12 of the Working Procedures adopted for the particular 
dispute.171 The panel decided to admit the evidence submitted by the 
United States without concluding whether the evidence in question 
 
 
169 There have already been a few precedents in this respect. Recently, the 
parties and the panel in US—Continued Suspension and Canada—Continued 
Suspension WT/DS 320R (Sept. 2006); WT/DS 321/R (Oct. 2006) agreed to make 
public the hearings of the panels. The disputes are linked to a broader dispute between 
the parties (i.e. the EC–Hormones case). In the present cases, the EC contends that the 
United States and Canada should have removed their retaliatory measures since the 
EC had removed the measures found to be inconsistent with WTO in the EC–
Hormones case. The EC claims against the United States include violations of GATT, 
art. I, II (1994) and DSU, art. 21.5, 22.8, 23.1, and 23.2 (a), (c). 
170 E.g., Interim Report, EC—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, WT/DS291/INTERIM, WT/DS292/INTERIM, 
WT/DS293/INTERIM, (Feb. 7, 2006). Due to the complex nature of the legal and 
factual issues of the case, the parties were allowed to transmit a third written 
submission. 
171 Panel Report, European Communities—Selected Customs Matters, ¶ 7.65, 
WT/DS315/R (June 16, 2006). 
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could be characterized as “new” factual evidence or as evidence 
“necessary for purposes of rebuttals” within the meaning of paragraph 
12 of the Working Procedures.  
The panel emphasized that its decision only related to the 
admissibility of evidence referred to by the United States in section III 
of its oral statement at the second substantive meeting, and that it had 
“no bearing on the weight, if any, that the Panel may ultimately 
attribute to such evidence.”172 
 
G. The Interim Review Stage 
 
Under the old GATT, the panel issued a descriptive section of the 
draft report after the second substantive meeting. This report included 
an introduction to the case, its factual content, and the legal arguments 
put forward by the parties. This phase was useful because it provided 
an opportunity for the panel to see if it had correctly assessed the facts 
of the case and understood the parties’ arguments.173 
The DSU developed a similar innovation for the final stages of the 
panel procedure—the Interim Review Stage. This stage consists of two 
phases. The first phase provides parties with an opportunity to 
comment on the descriptive part of the panel report, while the second 
phase allows the parties to comment on the entire panel report draft. 
Panels issue the descriptive part of the report after the second 
substantive meeting, which summarizes the facts and arguments raised 
by the parties in the course of the proceedings. The parties may submit 
comments on the descriptive part pointing out whether certain facts 
and arguments have been precisely recorded. This should be done 
within the time limit established by the panel, normally within two 
weeks after receipt of the descriptive part of the report.174 This first 
phase is the last opportunity to correct any factual errors in the panel 
report. 
Approximately two to four weeks after the deadline for receipt of 
comments on the descriptive part, the panel issues an interim report.175 
The interim report contains both the descriptive part and the findings 
of the panel. Parties must submit written comments on the interim 
report within one week of its publication. However, if no comments 
are received, then the interim report becomes final. 
 
 
172 Id. 
173 See HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 69. 
174 DSU, Appendix 3, ¶ 12(f). 
175 See Appendix 3 to the DSU, Working Procedures, supra note 22, at ¶ 12 (g). 
Panelists dealing with lengthy and complex legal issues usually need more time to 
complete the interim report. 
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In practice, parties receive the interim report first and then 
translations are circulated among WTO Members. The parties possess 
the right to make comments and request additional meetings on the 
“precise aspects of the interim report” 176  raised in the written 
comments.177 Additional evidence is inadmissible during this stage. 
In India – Automotive Industry, the panel accepted new evidence 
that India presented at the interim review stage. Although the new 
evidence submission arrived too late, the panel nonetheless accepted 
the evidence because it “sought to confirm the official status of the 
measure as it had already been argued and discussed during the 
proceedings.” 178  It is also acknowledged that new arguments are 
permissible during the interim stage if they are made “in the context of 
a request for review of precise aspects of the interim report.”179 
 
1. Issues raised by the interim review stage 
 
The DSU requires the panel to include a discussion of the 
arguments brought forth during the interim review stage in the 
findings of the final report. Panels take into account the observations 
made by the parties on specific points. In practice, the final panel 
report contains this additional information in a special section entitled 
“Interim Review.”  
Shortly after the introduction of the interim review stage, some 
scholars expressed doubts about its positive role. For example, Hudec 
argues that the interim review stage model is useless in WTO panels 
because it is an imitation of the Canada-United States Free Trade 
 
 
176 This was confirmed by the panel report in Australia–Salmon. Australia 
requested a review of the entire report as “a large part of the legal reasoning of the 
interim report was not based on an objective assessment of the matter before the 
Panel.” The panel disagreed with the complainant and only reviewed the interim report 
“in light of the comments made by the parties which relate to ‘precise aspects’ of the 
interim report.” Panel Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, ¶ 
7.3, WT/DS18/R (June 12, 1998). 
177 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 15.2, second sentence. Such an additional meeting 
at the interim review stage was held in the EC–Hormones case. The panel emphasized 
that only “precise aspects” of the interim report, identified in the written comments, 
may be subject to review. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), part VII, ¶ 7.1, WT/DS48/R/CAN 
(Aug. 18, 1997). 
178 Panel Report, India—Measure Affecting the Automotive Sector, 
WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R (Dec. 21, 2001) at ¶ 6.54. It should be remembered that 
the question of admitting evidence is very different from the question of how much 
weight the evidence is going to receive. 
179 Panel Report, United States–Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/R (Mar. 
31, 2000) at ¶ 5.18. 
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Agreement (CUSTA) and NAFTA, where the needs of the stage are 
very different than the needs under the DSU. In both CUSTA and 
NAFTA, says Hudec, panel members are all non-governmental 
lawyers and academics who lack any formal connection with the 
international institutions in question. Moreover, the permanent 
secretariats of these institutions do not offer panels any substantive 
legal advice, and panels hold only one hearing. 
Among other arguments supporting this thesis are that the WTO 
panels are supported by legal professionals from the WTO Secretariat, 
the process involves two or three substantive meetings, and panel 
decisions may be appealed before the Appellate Body. Hudec notes 
that “[a] specific change in the panel procedure that has enlisted 
considerable support is a proposal to delete the ‘interim report’ stage 
of the panel process,” suggesting that by removing the interim review 
stage, panels will have more time to prepare their reports.180 
P. Pescatore also critiques the interim review stage. Initially, he 
suggests that the development of the rules and procedures, such as the 
interim review stage, increases the procedure required by the panel, 
and promotes a “countervailing tendency of governments to regain 
control of the system at all stages” by influencing the panel’s 
deliberations and legal argumentation. He further asserts that this 
influence not only jeopardizes the panelists’ independence, but may 
also unbalance the final report because the panel must comment on all 
objections made by the parties at this late stage.181 
The interim review stage during the first years of the DSU brought 
with it exaggerated fears for several reasons. Firstly, the new WTO 
framework includes a number of new substantial legal obligations. 
Additionally, the types of cases put forward not only present complex 
legal issues, they also require heavy documentation—a daunting 
combination. . That being said, the interim review stage does spare the 
parties from future headaches owing to a surprising final panel report 
by offering them an opportunity during the interim, to voice their 
concerns over any indications of the panel’s unsound reasoning. 
However, Hudec also suggests that the interim review stage 
discourages the losing party from raising its objections because the 
panel will correct its error and as a consequence, the party will lose “a 
 
 
180 Hudec, An Overview, supra note 166, at 53–54. See also Andrew Shoyer, The 
First Three Years of WTO Dispute Settlement: Observations and Suggestions, 1 J. 
INT'L ECON. L. 277 (1998). 
181 Pescatore, supra note 76, at 39–41. It should be noted that this article was 
written in 1993 when the Uruguay Round was in progress and the DSU was not yet in 
force. 
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weapon on appeal.”182 Although this argument appears plausible, an 
opposing side may advance in support of the opposite view. On one 
hand, if a party does not raise its objections, the panel will have 
additional time to concentrate on the preparation of the report. 
However, on the other hand, if the party raises its objections, it will be 
even better since the panel will be able to correct its legal reasoning at 
an early stage. Therefore, the Appellate Body will only have to 
confirm the panel’s corrected legal argument. In sum, because the 
panel’s decision may not be appealed, the interim review stage helps 
correct any unconvincing legal interpretations. 
Moreover, the interim review stage is confined to both the time 
limits established by Article 12.8 of the DSU, 183 and the policy that 
parties are not allowed to advance any further evidence or discuss the 
substance of the case. 184  These requirements both guarantee that 
panels are not overloaded with new legal work at this stage and that no 
undue burden will be placed on the panelists. Despite Hudec’s 
assertions, the interim review stage does slow the panel process, but is 
actually a tool to ease the panels’ efforts in reaching more convincing 
legal interpretations and to improve the quality of their panel reports 
within the given time limits. 
Furthermore, the submission of written comments is a legal right. 
If the parties fail to send in comments within the time limit established 
by the panel, the interim report is considered final and is circulated to 
the Members. Whether or not the interim review stage fulfills the 
WTO Members’ expectations as embodied in the DSU requires a 
detailed study of WTO cases over an extended period. The panel 
reports from the first years of the WTO do indicate that the interim 
review stage, rather than being an additional burden on the panel, is a 
useful innovation that results in more well- reasoned reports. 
 
 
 
 
182 Hudec, An Overview, supra note 166, at 54. 
183 Six months is provided for the panel to complete its report, or three months in 
cases of urgency. 
184 New evidence cannot be introduced during the interim review stage. In EC–
Customs, in its comments on the Interim Report, the European Communities referred 
to a number of exhibits that it had not relied upon previously during the panel 
proceedings. The complainant (the United States) objected by stating that “new 
evidence during the interim review stage of the Panel’s proceedings is entirely 
impermissible and the Panel should give no consideration to that evidence.” The panel 
found that Article 15.2 of the DSU clearly indicated that “the purpose of the interim 
review stage of the Panel's proceedings is to review ‘'precise aspects’ of the Interim 
Report.” Therefore, pursuant to Article 15.2 of the DSU, the panel was precluded from 
taking into consideration evidence not reflected in the Interim Report. Panel Report, 
EC—Selected Customs Matters, ¶¶ 6.3–6.6, WT/DS315/R (June 16, 2006). 
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2. Third parties and amicus briefs 
 
a. Third parties. Third-party participation in panel proceedings 
increased considerably within the WTO as compared to that within the 
GATT. In the WTO, participation of third parties in consultations is 
allowed only for WTO Member States, and additionally, depends on 
the will of the main disputing parties. However, third party 
participation in panel proceedings cannot be rejected if the party 
demonstrates a “substantial interest in the matter.” In practice, panels 
apply a broad interpretation to the meaning of substantial interest, and 
each Member with a vested interest in a DSB matter to the DSB takes 
part in the panel proceedings. 
The DSU grants third parties limited procedural rights. Under the 
DSU, third parties receive an opportunity to be heard and make written 
submissions to the panel. The panel report reflects these submissions 
and notifies parties of their existence.185 Third parties receive the main 
parties’ first written submissions, but can only attend panel sessions by 
invitation. The Appendix specifies that a third party that has given 
notice of its interest in a dispute shall be invited in writing to present 
its view during a session of the first meeting set aside specially for that 
purpose.186 In this meeting, the party may answer questions advanced 
by the panel or other parties. After the end of the session, third parties 
do not attend other sessions or meetings in the framework of the 
proceedings.  
b. Amicus curiae briefs. The recent trend of amicus curiae briefs 
(non-governmental organizations and individuals submitting 
unsolicited briefs) is subject to a broad debate since such submissions 
did not exist within the old GATT dispute settlement mechanism. 
For example, amicus briefs have been filed in US – Reformulated 
Gasoline,187 in EC – Hormones,188 and in subsequent cases. In US – 
Shrimps, the panel interpreted Article 13 of the DSU to mean (even 
though it had authority to seek information from non-governmental 
source) that it would be “incompatible” with the DSU to accept and 
take into account such unsolicited information. For this reason, if any 
 
 
185 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 10.2. 
186 DSU, supra note 22, at 1245, app. 3, ¶ 6. 
187 Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (May 20, 1996). 
188 ee Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26/R/USA, WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) as modified by 
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/48/AB/R, (adopted Feb. 13, 1998).  
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party relies on such submissions, it could include them in its own 
submissions.189  
The Appellate Body reversed this finding by stating that 
acceptance of unsolicited information by a panel is not incompatible 
with the DSU. A panel has discretion to accept or ignore information 
and advice submitted to it, regardless of whether it had been requested 
by the panel or not.190 The Appellate Body has also observed that 
access to the dispute settlement system under the covered agreements 
is not available to individuals and organizations, but only to WTO 
Members. 
In emphasizing the difference between third parties in the panel 
process and amicus briefs, the Appellate Body notes that third parties 
have a legal right to make submissions to the panel and a legal right to 
have them considered by the panel. As a consequence, “a panel is 
obliged in law to accept and give due consideration only to 
submissions made by the parties and the third parties in a panel 
proceeding.”191 Hence, panels have no obligation to consider amicus 
briefs, but may do so at their discretion.  
After US – Shrimps, amicus briefs have been filed in a number of 
cases. In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body elaborated on an 
additional procedure for filing amicus submissions. Although this 
procedure was used specifically for that appeal only, it has provided 
numerous requirements, inter alia, that the brief shall indicate “in what 
way the applicant will make a contribution to the resolution of this 
dispute that is not likely to be repetitive of what has been already 
submitted by a party or third party to the dispute.”192 The Appellate 
Body has received seventeen applications pursuant to the additional 
procedure. For one reason or another, the Appellate Body has denied 
the right to file a written brief in all of them. 
The stringent requirements set by the Appellate Body for 
submitting amicus briefs create a number of legal problems, thereby 
cancelling the significance of these submissions. One problem is that 
such submissions are not provided for explicitly in the DSU and other 
WTO Agreements. Additionally, the disapproval of some WTO 
Members and, more particularly, of a number of developing Members, 
 
 
189 Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 7.7–7.8, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998). 
190 Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 108, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). 
191 Id. at ¶ 101. 
192 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products (EC-Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R 
(adopted Apr. 5, 2001, at ¶¶ 52. 
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is evident. Their view is that allowing the filing of unsolicited 
information deprives a panel from the right to decide the kind of 
information that is needed. Therefore, they believe if no one requests 
such information, then these briefs should not be accepted. Another 
problem is that in order to file these submissions, applicants must 
know the disputing parties’ views in order for the amicus briefs to not 
repeat what has already been submitted by the parties or third parties. 
The WTO dispute settlement system, however, remains 
“intergovernmental,” and the panel and appeal proceedings are 
confidential, and most States would be reluctant to reveal confidential 
information anyway. Moreover, these submissions are often biased 
and contradict the Member government’s positions. Finally, allowing 
extensive submissions also creates a heavy burden on panels and the 
Appellate Body. Considering the numerous requirements elaborated 
by the Appellate Body in US – Shrimps, and the fact that no single 
panel or the Appellate Body ever based its findings on amicus briefs, it 
appears the debate on such submissions is “much ado about 
nothing.”193 
 
IV. SPECIAL PROCEDURAL RULES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Developing countries have increased their participation in the 
panel proceedings in recent years. For example, in 2001 seventy-five 
percent of all complaints were filed by developing countries.194 Also, 
developing WTO Members often take part in panel proceedings as 
third parties. Rules on special and differential treatment for developing 
countries are elaborated either as substantive WTO provisions (e.g., 
longer time for implementation of certain obligations) or procedural 
dispute settlement rules (e.g., faster procedure, longer time limits). 
The DSU recognizes the special needs of developing countries by 
including rules unique to developing countries participating in panel 
proceedings. At the stage of the panel composition, if a dispute is 
between a developed and a developing country, the latter may request 
the appointment of at least one panelist from a developing country 
Member.195 
In examining a complaint against a developing country Member, 
the panel shall afford the respondent more time to prepare its defens, 
 
 
193 Petros C. Mavroidis, Amicus Curiae Briefs before the WTO: Much Ado about 
Nothing, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION: STUDIES IN 
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN HONOUR OF CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN, 317–30 
(Armin von Bogdandy, Petros C. Mavroidis & Yves Meny eds. 2002). 
194 Data provided in GUOHUA, MERCURIO & YONGJIE, supra note 153, at 110. 
195 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 8.10. 
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eif necessary.196 Thus upon request of a developing country, the panel 
should set up longer time periods than those provided in the DSU and 
the Working Procedure Annex. If a developing Member raises a 
question on special and differential treatment within the panel 
proceedings regarding both substantive and procedural rules, the panel 
is obligated to indicate in the panel report the form in which these 
rules have been taken into account pursuant to Article 12.11 of the 
DSU.197  
In addition, when a developing Member brings proceedings 
against a developed Member, the former may choose to apply the 
accelerated procedure under the Contracting Parties' Decision of 5 
April 1966. 198  These rules originated from the old GATT dispute 
settlement mechanism, and remain applicable within the WTO due to 
an explicit reference in Article 3.12 of the DSU.199 However, except 
for a few cases, developing Members have not invoked the provisions 
of the decision. These proceedings have only been requested in six 
instances under the old GATT.200 
If a developing country resorts to the 1966 Decision, Articles 4, 5, 
6 and 12 of the DSU do not apply, and the rules of the decision apply 
instead. The 1966 Decision provides that if consultations between the 
parties fail, the developing country may solicit the offices of the WTO 
Director-General to conduct consultations between the disputants.201 If 
the consultations do not settle the dispute within two months, the 
Director-General must prepare a special report on the actions he has 
taken at the request of either party. In regards to the panel stage, the 
decision requires the panel to complete its report in only sixty days (in 
contrast with the normal six-month time limit for completion of the 
panel report). 202  In addition, the panel shall pay due regard to all 
circumstances relating to the challenged measure and its impact on the 
economic development of the developing Member.203 
 
 
196 Such additional time to prepare its first written submissions was granted to 
India. Panel Report, India—Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, 
Textiles and Industrial Products, ¶ 5.8–5.10, WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999). 
197 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 12.11. 
198 Conciliation, Procedures Under Article XXIII (Apr. 5, 1966), GATT B.I.S.D. 
(14th Supp.), at 18 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Decision]. 
199 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.12. 
200 2 GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE: ANALYTICAL INDEX 765 (WTO 
1995). 
201 1966 Decision, supra note 199. 
202 See 1966 Decision, supra note 199, at 19, ¶ 7. 
203 See 1966 Decision, supra note 199, at 19, ¶ 6. 
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All procedural rules applicable to developing Members also apply 
to least-developed WTO Members. In addition, there are a few rules in 
the DSU specifically for least-developed Members. When 
consultations have not settled a dispute involving a least-developed 
country, the director-general or the chairman of the DSB shall, at the 
request of the least developed country, “offer good offices, 
conciliation and mediation with a view to assisting the parties to settle 
the dispute, before a request for a panel is made.”204 Article 24 of the 
DSU205 requires Members to exercise due restraint when initiating 
dispute settlement proceedings against a less developed country. Such 
restraint is exercised when rulings are not implemented within a 
reasonable period of time, and a Member requests compensation for or 
authorization to suspend obligations against a least-developed 
country.206 Least-developed countries receive special consideration at 
all stages of the dispute settlement procedures. Finally, the WTO 
Secretariat provides legal advice and assistance on dispute settlement 
to both developing and least-developed Members.207 
 
V. IMPORTANT ISSUES OF THE PANEL PROCESS 
 
A. The Burden of Proof 
 
The issue of the burden of proof was less significant within the old 
GATT dispute settlement system, most likely because disputing parties 
often presented panels with agreed-upon facts. Under the old GATT, 
the burden of proof was considered as “more [of] an intellectual 
concept than a practical one” because panels questioned both parties, 
giving neither one nor the other the benefit of the doubt.208  
However, the WTO incorporated at least two rules regarding the 
burden of proof from the old GATT system. First, the complainant 
party must prove the violation it alleges. Second, a respondent who 
invokes general exceptions under GATT Article XX must prove that 
the conditions related are fulfilled.209 In the WTO panel process, the 
question of who bears the burden of proof is critical because unlike the 
early years of the GATT, the disputing parties within the WTO contest 
 
 
204 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 24.2. 
205 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 24. 
206 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 24.1, last sentence. 
207 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 27.2. 
208 In this sense, see Plank, supra note 15, at 78. 
209 On the burden of proof in the GATT and the WTO, see Joost Pauwelyn, 
Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Bears the Burden? 
1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 227 (1998). 
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numerous facts and evidence in the panel proceedings, and the 
allocation of the burden of proof may decide the outcome of the case. 
The DSU does not contain specific rules regarding the burden of proof 
in panel proceedings; however, this is important because in cases 
where certain facts are questionable during the proceedings, a panel 
will rule in favor of the party who does not bear the burden of proof.  
The Appellate Body emphasizes that the party who asserts a fact 
must prove it. In other words, the burden of proof for a fact rests upon 
the party who asserts that fact. 210  Thus a complainant alleging 
inconsistency with a WTO agreement must prove its claim; however, 
no exact standard for the level of proof exists. The Appellate Body has 
clarified that the complainant must present evidence sufficient to make 
a prima facie case that the claim is true.211 In turn, the respondent has 
to rebut the claim. When invoking an exception to a particular 
provision, the respondent carries the burden of proving that the 
requirements for such an exception are met.212  
Articles XX and XXI of the GATT 1994 provide examples of 
applicable exceptions.213  WTO jurisprudence further clarifies some 
specific items regarding the burden of proof. For instance, the 
Enabling Clause provided by the Decision on More Favourable 
Treatment is not a typical exception to Article II of GATT 1994. Thus 
the claimant has to invoke the Enabling Clause and demonstrate the 
measure’s inconsistency with it. Likewise, the link between Articles 
5(1) and 5(7) of the SPS Agreement 214  is not a rule-exception 
relationship. As the panel in EC – Biotech Products (“GMOs”) stated, 
Art. 5(7) sets forth a right, not an exception, to Article 5(1).215 Thus 
the burden of proof rests with the complainant to demonstrate the 
inconsistency of the measure with Article 5(7). In other words, the 
complainant must demonstrate that the respondent did not fulfil one of 
the four requirements stated in the provision.216 
 
 
210 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting Imports of Woven 
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) (adopted May 
23, 1997), part IV, at 12 et seq. 
211 Id. 
212 Such exceptions are, for instance, those provided for in Articles XX and XXI 
of the GATT 1994. 
213 GATT 1994, Annex 1 A to the WTO, 33 I.L.M 1156 (1994). 
214 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), 
Annex 1 to the WTO Agreement, reproduced in THE LEGAL TEXTS. THE RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 401 (Cambridge 
University Press & WTO 1999) at 59. 
215 Interim Report, EC—Biotech Products (GMOs), ¶ 7.2988. 
216 The four requirements are: 1) the measure is imposed in respect of situation 
where “relevant scientific evidence is insufficient;” 2) the measure is imposed on the 
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1. Evidence 
 
Neither the old GATT System, nor the DSU, contains any specific 
provisions concerning evidence in the panel procedure. Rather, the 
WTO dispute settlement relies on rules established by international 
law and other international tribunals. Panels have discretion on the 
type of evidence deemed acceptable and the weight given to each 
piece of evidence. Panels may use their own discretion and investigate 
the facts without request from any party. A panel must base its 
findings only on the evidence submitted by the parties, but may seek 
information from any relevant source. However, this does not mean 
that a panel is allowed to carry out the case. In order for the panel to 
search for additional information, the claimant must first establish a 
prima facie case by presenting evidence sufficient to raise a 
presumption of fact or to establish the fact in question.  
A panel may seek technical information, when it considers this 
appropriate, by establishing an expert review group or consulting 
individual scientific experts as set forth in Appendix 4 to the DSU.217 
A panel may also consult experts on an individual basis. 
Individual scientific experts were consulted for the first time in EC – 
Asbestos.218 In this case, the panel found that it had the right to consult 
individual experts, despite the respondent’s objection and argument 
that a panel may consult experts only through an expert review group 
under Appendix 4 to the DSU.219  
Although the DSU does not prescribe specific time limits for 
submitting evidence, panels are obligated to respect the principle of 
due process throughout the panel procedure, and to ensure that they 
give parties an adequate opportunity to respond to the evidence. 
Normally, the deadline for submitting evidence is during the end of the 
first substantive meeting, but depending on the circumstances, 
evidence can be accepted by the panel at a later time. The panel may 
 
 
basis of available pertinent information; 3) the Member “seek[s] to obtain additional 
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk;” and 4) the Member 
“review[s] the measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.” Art. 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement, Annex 1 to the WTO Agreement, reproduced in THE LEGAL TEXTS. 
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 401 
(Cambridge University Press & WTO 1999) at 59. 
217 DSU, supra note 22, Appendix 4. 
218 Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos Containing Products (EC-Asbestos), WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) as 
modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS135/AB/R (July 25, 2000) (adopted Apr. 
5, 2001). 
219 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products (EC-Asbesotos), WT/DS135/AB/R 
(March 12, 2001) (adopted Apr. 5, 2001) at ¶ 147. 
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grant a time extension if the party shows there is a good cause for 
submitting the evidence and if the evidence is needed to respond to 
rebuttal arguments. 
 
2. Rules of interpretation and the applicable law 
 
The DSU requires panels to state in the report the findings of facts, 
the applicability of relevant provisions, and the basic rationale and 
recommendations of the findings. According to Article 11.1 of the 
DSU, “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter 
before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and 
the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered 
agreements.”220  
Despite this objective requirement, appeals grounded in the 
argument that “the panel has failed to make an objective assessment of 
the facts” have been quickly dismissed by the Appellate Body in 
several cases. In United States – Zeroing, the European Communities 
contended that the panel acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the 
DSU by demonstrating “insufficient reasoning” and not making an 
objective assessment of the facts.221 The Appellate Body rejected the 
claim, emphasizing that a claim under Article 11 of the DSU is a “very 
serious allegation” and that a challenge under Article 11 of the DSU 
must not be vague or ambiguous. On the contrary, such a challenge 
must be clearly articulated and substantiated with specific 
arguments. 222  Moreover, “not every failure by the Panel in the 
appreciation of the evidence before it can be characterized as failure to 
make an objective assessment of the facts.”223  Thus the Appellate 
Body rejected the claim because it was “vague and mentioned only in 
passing in its appellant's submission.”224 
Apart from making an objective assessment of the facts, panels 
shall apply the relevant legal provisions. The applicable law in the 
panel proceedings within the old GATT was quite straightforward 
because GATT panels normally applied the provisions of the GATT 
only. This question, however, is much more complicated under the 
WTO in light of the much broader trade issues covered by the WTO 
agreements. The connection between the WTO law and international 
 
 
220 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 11.1. 
221 Appellate Body Report, United States—Laws, Regulations and Methodology 
for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), ¶ 251,WT/DS294/AB/R (Apr. 18, 
2006) (adopted May 9, 2006).. 
222 Id. at ¶ 253. 
223 Id. at ¶254. 
224 Id. 
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law is obvious. While some WTO agreements refer to other disciplines 
of international law (e.g., Article XX of GATT 1994), other WTO 
provisions make a direct link with particular treaties that are outside 
the WTO law (e.g., Article 1 (3) of TRIPS). In his analysis on Article 
7 of the DSU, Pauwelyn concludes that rules of international law can 
be applied in the panel proceedings unless the WTO agreements 
explicitly deviate or contract out of this other law.225 
The DSU in Article 3.2 establishes a direct link with international 
law by explicitly providing that the WTO dispute settlement system 
aims at preserving the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements, and at clarifying “the existing provisions of those 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law.”226 The old GATT did not contain such a 
provision. 
Scholars have expressed different opinions on whether or not 
substantive non-WTO rules may apply in panel proceedings. Some 
authors assert that international law rules may not be applied as an 
autonomous source of law, arguing that only customary rules of 
interpretation may be considered by panels and the Appellate Body.227 
 
 
225 Among the many arguments supporting his thesis, Pauwelyn notes that, 
unlike Article 293 of the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), Article 1131 of 
NAFTA, and Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, the DSU does not make an explicit 
reference to other rules of international law. Then he explains why this is the case:  
 
[G]iven the nature of the WTO Agreement as a treaty under public 
international law, there was no need for the DSU to do so. On the 
contrary, the principle is that all other international law continues to 
exist next to the WTO treaty unless the WTO treaty explicitly deviates 
or contracts out of this other law. In other words, there was no need for 
Article 7 of the DSU to explicitly include also other rules of 
international law as part of the applicable law before WTO panels; to 
the extent that those other rules were not deviated from in the WTO 
treaty, this is automatically the case. 
 
Joost Pauwelyn, How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on Non-
World Trade Organization Law? Questions of Jurisdiction and Merit, 6 J. WORLD 
TRADE 997, 1002 (2003). See also Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in 
International Law: Praises for the Prohibition Against ‘Clinical Isolation’ in WTO 
Dispute Settlement, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 87 (1999); Gabrielle Marceau, Conflicts of 
Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 1081 (2001); Joost 
Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 
95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535 (2001) (further discussing applicable law in the panel 
proceedings). 
226 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 3.2. 
227 See Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of the WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 333 (1999) (suggesting a narrow interpretation of the DSU 
provisions with regard to the applicable law in panel proceedings). 
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Other commentators suggest a broader interpretation of Article 7 of 
the DSU. A distinction is made between Article 1.1 of the DSU and 
Article 7 of the DSU, with the former outlining the jurisdiction of 
panels and the latter relating to the law that panels may apply to a 
particular dispute.228 It is clear that panels must decline jurisdiction 
pursuant to Article 1.1 of the DSU if a dispute does not involve 
matters within the covered agreements (i.e., is not a WTO dispute).229 
However, even in this case, examination of other rules of international 
law (non-WTO rules) is needed in order to determine the lack of 
jurisdiction. In short, the choice of law process in the WTO is 
significantly more complex as the panel looks to not only apply WTO 
provisions, as was done in the GATT, but also must examine other 
related non-WTO rules of international law.  
Though the process is much more cumbersome, it should be 
supported as a significant improvement from the GATT. According to 
Article 7.1 of the DSU, panels and the Appellate Body shall examine 
the matter “in the light of the relevant provisions in . . . the covered 
agreement[s] cited by the parties to the dispute.”230 Pauwelyn finds 
that this provision imposes an obligation on panels to address and 
apply certain WTO rules; however, it does not preclude panels from 
applying other non-WTO rules of international law in particular 
circumstances.231  
 
3. Panels giving deference to developing countries 
  
In a recent case, the small country, Antigua and Barbuda, initiated 
panel proceedings against the largest trading nation, the United 
States.232 Even though the Appellate Body has reversed a large part of 
the panel findings, Antigua and Barbuda won on essential points of the 
legal battle. Inter alia, the Appellate Body confirmed the panel’s 
finding that the application of the U.S. Horse-racing Act was contrary 
to the U.S. obligations under the GATS. In sum, and in contrast to the 
GATT, the WTO panel process has greatly advanced the deference 
 
 
228 See generally Lorand Bartels, Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement 
Proceedings, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 499 (2001). 
229 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 1.1. 
230 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 7.1. 
231 Pauwelyn, How to Win a World Trade Organization Dispute Based on Non-
World Trade Organization Law? Questions of Jurisdiction and Merit, 6 J. WORLD 
TRADE 997 (2003) at 1000-1001. 
232 See Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) as modified 
by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005).  
WINTER 2006 PANEL PROCEDURES 
135 
given to developing countries in an effort to be sensitive to their 
special circumstances. 
 
4. Time limits and other requirements in preparing the panel report 
 
The panel starts preparing the report after the hearings are over, 
and all written submissions and rebuttals have been received. The 
panel makes an objective assessment of the matter before including the 
facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the 
relevant covered agreements. The panel must also make findings that 
will assist the DSB in giving the rulings provided for in the covered 
agreements.233 Lastly, and as mentioned earlier, all conclusions drawn 
by the panel in its report must be reasoned. 
In addition to these requirements, Article 12.8 of the DSU 
provides that the period in which the panel must conduct its 
examination may not exceed six months from the date on which the 
composition and terms of reference are agreed upon to the issuance of 
the final report to the parties of the dispute.234 In cases of urgency, 
including those relating to perishable goods, panels are to aim at 
issuing its report within three months. If a panel is unable to complete 
its report within six months (or three months, if applicable), it must 
inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay, and indicate an 
estimated date of issue. 
The DSU further stipulates that the period should not exceed nine 
months in any case from the time the panel is established to the 
circulation of the report to WTO Members. In many cases, however, 
the time limits established by the DSU for completion of a panel report 
are unrealistic. Panels need more time to prepare their reports based on 
the reasoning requirements described above. For instance, in the EC – 
Asbestos case, the time between the establishment of the panel and the 
issuance of the panel report to the parties was more than 19 months.235 
It would be overly ambitious to expect the panel to finish its report on 
EC – Biotech Products (GMOs) in six months, since the interim report 
alone amounted to more than 1,000 pages.236 
 
 
 
 
233 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 11. 
234 DSU, supra note 22, at art. 12.8. 
235 Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000). 
236 See Interim Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting the 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (GMOs), WT/DS291-291-
293/INTERIM (Feb. 7, 2006). 
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5. Adoption of panel reports 
 
The current WTO process for adopting panel reports is, in large 
part, a result of the fortuitous abolition of the veto power in the 
adoption of panel reports under the old GATT. The main reason for 
this change was the adoption of Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Law in 
1988, which allowed unilateral trade sanctions when the United States 
considered (unilaterally) other GATT Members in violation of their 
GATT obligations.  
The other GATT Members viewed this legislation as a threat, and 
the United States, in response, complained of the weak and slow 
dispute procedure, which did not efficiently protect U.S. trade 
interests. As a consequence, they reached a compromise—no veto 
power to block the most important decisions in the framework of the 
dispute resolution mechanism (establishment of panels, adoption of 
panel reports, and authorisation for retaliation), and no unilateral 
action by WTO Members to decide trade disputes between them.237 
In the WTO, after a panel has completed its report and has 
distributed it to the WTO Members, the DSB must adopt it in order for 
the report to be become binding on the disputing parties. The panel 
report is put on the agenda of the DSB at the request of either 
disputing party, at which point, every WTO Member has the right to 
make comments and express opinions concerning the report at the 
DSB meeting. According to the DSU, the DSB must adopt a panel 
report not earlier than twenty-days, but not later than sixty days after 
the date of its circulation to WTO Members, unless one of the 
disputing parties (the complainant or the respondent, but not third 
parties) appeals to the Appellate Body.238  
If there is no appeal, the DSB adopts the panel report, unless a 
reverse consensus arises against its adoption. Under the old GATT, 
because of the rule of positive consensus, even one single formal 
objection by a WTO Member was enough to block adoption. In 
contrast, under the WTO, even a majority against the panel report is 
not enough to prevent its adoption. After the adoption of the report, the 
dispute settlement procedure goes into the stage of implementation of 
the DSB’s ruling. 
 
 
237 This compromise also led to the inclusion, upon the insistence of developed 
countries, and more particularly the United States, of new disciplines within the scope 
of the WTO, such as intellectual property and trade in services. 
238 In the case of an appeal, the Appellate Body report, together with the panel 
report as modified by the Appellate Body, will be adopted within thirty days after its 
circulation to the WTO Members. Technically, the procedure for adoption is the same 
as that for a panel report. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The differences between the panel procedures of the GATT and 
the WTO should not be overestimated. The WTO panel procedure 
relies heavily on the practice created during the forty-seven-year 
existence of the old GATT. It would be insufficient to describe the old 
GATT dispute settlement procedure solely as “diplomatic,” although it 
is true that in the first thirty years of the GATT, the panel procedure 
mainly was of a diplomatic character.  
In the 1970s, this diplomatic approach to dispute resolution 
became inadequate due to the increase of complicated and politically 
sensitive disputes. This change toward legalization was even more 
significant in the last fifteen years of the GATT’s existence. Hudec 
aptly describes this evolution by stating that after 1980, the system 
“transformed itself into an institution based primarily on the authority 
of legal obligation.” 239  Therefore, it is not surprising that a more 
legalistic system emerged after the Uruguay round. However, the 
legalization of the dispute settlement system cannot be explained 
solely as a passage from “more politics” in the first years of the GATT 
to “more law” with the creation of the WTO. Rather, the legal 
advancements in the panel procedure have been the product of a 
bidirectional interaction between law and politics. The added 
complications of trade issues and more extensive legal obligations 
have created the need for a stronger dispute settlement system that is 
able preserve the rights and obligations of WTO Members under the 
agreements.240 
Though the GATT panel procedure in the 1980s became more 
legalized and some procedural improvements were made, it was 
entirely optional. However, the political pressure to comply with the 
panel rulings was considerable and helped facilitate efficiency of the 
procedure. The GATT mechanism was successful, and there is good 
reason to believe that its successor, the WTO dispute settlement 
system, will be successful too.  
The new WTO panel procedure, theoretically, is much more 
detailed and improved. The panel reports under the WTO are also 
more detailed and specific compared to panel reports under the GATT 
 
 
239 Hudec, An Overview, supra note 166, at 9. 
240 See generally Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of the World Trade, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2005) (challenging the traditional view of the evolution of the world 
trading system, which is often explained as a “unidirectional process of legalization 
focused exclusively on the system’s normative structure” and proposing a 
bidirectional interaction between law and politics). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 3 
138 
1947, and especially those from the first years of the GATT's 
existence, which “did not always express clear legal results.”241 
The increase of the number of disputes, which have been brought 
before the WTO in its first years reveals the strong trust WTO 
Members have in the settlement system. Under the old GATT, many 
States refrained from starting panel proceedings and abstained from 
wasting financial resources because they believed the respondent party 
might block the adoption of the report once the panel process was 
completed. In the WTO, a large number of cases have been settled 
before the stage of panel composition possibly because complaints 
have been used as a negotiating instrument.242 Thus in light of the 
compulsory dispute settlement process, a mere threat to resort to the 
system can induce compliance in some cases. 
The GATT legacy still has a considerable impact on WTO panel 
proceedings. Panelists are still approved by the parties in most cases, 
secretariat officials are considered servants of the governments rather 
than of the panels, and the parties exercise a significant control over 
the panel process. This facet of party control has made some legal 
scholars suggest a more active role for panelists and the secretariat. 
The main proponent of a further legalization of the panel process is 
Hudec, who advocates transition from “party control” to an 
“independent control” model.243 This seems a logical continuation of 
the evolution of the panel process. A rule-based system with clear 
rules is a step in the right direction because this kind of system will 
create predictable conditions for business decisions and long-term 
investments. If the political support remains as strong as it has been 
since the creation of the GATT in 1947, then the WTO dispute 
settlement system may correctly be considered the most efficient 
interstate dispute settlement system in international law.  
 
 
 
241 HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 57. 
242 Hudec, An Overview, supra note 166, at 34 (estimating that of the eighty-four 
disputes filed between January 1, 1994 and January 1, 1998 only forty-four percent 
have resulted in the appointment of a panel). 
243 In his opinion panels should have a structure similar to that of the Appellate 
Body because its members are permanent, which avoids the constraints put on the ad 
hoc panelists chosen by the parties. Moreover, the Staff of the Appellate Body is their 
servant and not the servant of governments. In sum, “[t]his is what might be called 
‘judicial independence.” Hudec, An Overview, supra note 166, at 51–53. 
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VII. TABLE: THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GATT 
AND THE WTO PANEL PROCEDURES 
 
GATT WTO 
- In the first years of the GATT, the character 
of the dispute settlement system was 
diplomatic, although it slowly evolved 
toward a legalized system. 
- After the Tokyo Round, the dispute 
settlement was fragmented.  
- The WTO has detailed procedures for the 
various stages of the dispute settlement 
including specific time frames. 
- The WTO Dispute Settlement System is 
an integrated framework that applies to all 
covered agreements. 
Consultations  
- Consultations are derived under GATT 
Article XXII or XXIII. 
Consultations  
- Consultations are derived under the DSU 
and one or more of the covered agreements. 
These consultations are more formalized, 
and have specific time limits. 
Establishment of a panel 
- Consensus in the GATT Council is needed 
for the establishment of a panel. 
Establishment of a panel 
- Panel establishment cannot be blocked 
(reverse consensus in the DSB). 
Panel Composition 
- In the first years of the GATT, there was no 
rule to avoid a stalemate when the parties 
disagreed on the composition of the panels. 
Panel Composition 
- There are specific rules (solutions) in the 
DSU when there is no agreement between 
the disputing parties, regarding the 
composition of the panel.  
Terms of Reference 
- Terms of reference had to be approved by 
the GATT Council after the disputing parties 
had agreed on them. 
Terms of Reference 
- There are standard terms of reference, 
which are to be used if the parties cannot 
agree on the terms of reference within 20 
days from the panel’s establishment. 
First Written Submissions 
- The first written submissions were usually 
transmitted simultaneously by both parties 
under the old GATT. 
First Written Submissions 
- Under the WTO, the claimant sends in its 
written submissions two to three weeks in 
advance of the respondent. 
First Substantive Meeting 
- Under the GATT, the parties often 
presented the panel a set of facts they agreed 
upon (so-called “cluster of undisputed facts”) 
 
 
First Substantive Meeting 
- Under the WTO, the parties use every 
occasion to object to facts and arguments 
presented by the other party; as a 
consequence, there are many procedural 
objections. 
Third Party Participation 
- No third party participation in panels. 
Third Party Participation 
- There is significantly more participation 
by third parties (including amicus briefs, 
and use of experts’ group or individual 
expert’s advice). This is because there are 
more complex legal issues and because 
almost all complaints are brought under two 
or more covered agreements. 
Submission of the Descriptive Part of the 
Panel Report 
- As of the 1970s, panels started transmitting 
the descriptive part of the report to the 
parties. There is no Interim Review Stage 
under the GATT. 
Interim Review Stage 
- Submission of the descriptive part of the 
panel report is given to the parties. 
Comments are transmitted within two 
weeks. 
- There is an Interim Report that is 
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GATT WTO 
submitted to the parties (includes the 
descriptive part and the panel’s findings). 
Comments on this report may be submitted 
to the panel.  
- The parties may ask for an additional 
panel meeting within one week to discuss 
specific aspects of the report. This meeting 
is to be held within one or two weeks.  
- The discussion at the interim review stage 
shall be included in the final report. 
Final Panel Report 
- There are no particular time limits. Reports 
were completed within a period of three to 
nine months from the panel’s establishment 
in most cases. 
 
Final Panel Report 
- The panel report shall be issued to the 
parties within two weeks after the additional 
meeting requested at the interim stage. 
- The report is to be circulated to the parties 
within six months from panel’s 
composition, three months in cases of 
urgency. 
Panel Report Adoption 
- There is no automatic adoption of panel 
reports. Consensus is needed in the GATT 
Council. 
 
 
Panel Report Adoption 
- Adoption of the panel report cannot be 
blocked. 
- Automatic adoption in the WTO, DSB by 
reverse consensus within 60 days. 
- Panel reports are more detailed and legally 
reasoned. There is a possibility for appeal 
before the Appellate Body. 
Implementation 
- The Contracting Parties ”should” keep the 
matter on which they have been given a 
ruling under close watch. 
Implementation 
- There is a stronger mechanism for 
monitoring the implementation of DSB’s 
rulings. 
- The Member concerned informs the DSB 
of its intention regarding the 
implementation of the ruling at a DSB 
meeting within 30 days of the adoption. 
- The issue of implementation is placed on 
the BSD agenda after six months and 
remains on it until the issue is resolved. 
- The Member provides a status report of its 
progress on the implementation of the 
ruling at each such DSB meeting. 
 
